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Theories of fiscal federalism argue a decentralized system of governance increases 
efficiency because local governments can tax and spend according to local 
preferences. However, local governments are constrained by state policy, demography, 
and economy and these constraints increased during the Great Recession. How do 
these constraints shape local government choices and what are the implications for a 
federalist system? This dissertation uses two national studies and a single-state case 
study to explore the space for local government choices after the Great Recession. 
The first paper uses national survey data of US municipalities in 2012 to 
examine how service provision level and delivery methods are related to local stress 
and capacity, controlling for community need and place characteristics. Probit 
regressions show local governments use alternative revenue sources and service 
delivery methods (privatization and cooperation) to maintain services. 
The second paper uses 2012 Census of Governments data for 2,396 cities in 
metropolitan areas to explore how state policy, demography, and local context shape 
dependence on two important own-source revenues: property taxes and charges. OLS 
regression results show property tax dependence is higher in places with more 
capacity, while charges dependence is higher in places with more stress. 
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The third paper uses a case study of New York State to explain how politics 
shape local government choices. Focus group interviews with local officials show a 
state-driven narrative of inefficient local governments pressures local governments to 
maintain services without adequate revenues. The State can shift costs to local 
governments, while citizens think they can enjoy the same services with lower taxes. 
The consequences are expenditure cuts across the board and lack of long-term 
planning. 
These findings challenge the basic precepts of fiscal federalism regarding 
efficiency and transparency. This dissertation advances a theory of pragmatic 
municipalism whereby local governments work within their constraints and try to 
maintain their role as service-providers. However, this is not a sustainable strategy and 
the imbalance between local power and responsibilities remain. Under the current 
system, state level governments can shift fiscal stress to the local level and use the 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Local Governments and Austerity 
Local governments play an important role in the US governance system. The 
decentralized system of 38,910 local governments (defined as general-purpose local 
governments in this dissertation; 2012 Census of Governments) allows localities to 
experiment with diverse policies, creating “laboratories of democracy.” Furthermore, 
local governments can serve as spaces of participation (Pateman 1970), deliberation 
(Dryzek 2000), and discourse among citizens to build a “Great Community” (Dewey 
1954). In a more practical sense, local governments deliver a wide variety of services 
that people rely on every day (e.g. roads) and in times of need (e.g. social services). 
Perhaps reflecting this role of local governments, public opinion surveys find 
local governments consistently rank highest among the three levels of government for 
citizen trust. A 2013 survey by the Pew Research Center found 63% of respondents 
have a favorable view of local governments, compared to 57% for state governments 
and 28% for the federal government (Pew Research Center 2013) and Gallup’s 
Governance Poll shows similar results (71% trust local governments, compared to 
62% for states; Gallup 2016). However, concerns about local governments also 
increased after the Great Recession (or 2008 Recession) as the City of Detroit declared 
bankruptcy in 2013. Experts warned that fiscal stress among local governments are 
widespread (Congressional Budget Office 2010; Ward and Dadayan 2009), and 
austerity became an important keyword in public discourse (Peck 2012). 
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 Austerity refers to deficit reduction strategies by limiting government 
expenditures, increasing taxes, or both (Anderson and Minneman 2014). Anderson and 
Minneman (2014) point out that the impact of austerity depends on how we define 
austerity (e.g. any increases in tax or decreases in spending; fiscal consolidation with 
intent of reducing deficit; fiscal consolidation to correct past conditions). In the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, some see austerity as a political tool. Peck (2012) 
defines austerity as “the imposition of strict fiscal discipline and government spending 
cuts” (p. 626) that hurts vulnerable populations and creates profits for a select few 
(e.g. ALEC1 members). Blyth (2013) defines austerity as follows: 
 
a form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through 
the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending to restore 
competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the 
states’ budget, debts, and deficits. Doing so, its advocates believe, 
will inspire ‘business confidence’ since the government will neither 
be ‘crowding-out’ the market for investment by sucking up all the 
available capital through the issuance of debt, nor adding to the 
nation’s already ‘too big’ debt. (p. 2) 
 
                                                 
1 ALEC or the American Legislative Exchange Council is a private organization of 
large corporations, corporate lobbyists, and state legislators. The organization drafts 
model bills that focus on shrinking government size and regulations. 
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 The US Census Bureau’s Census of Governments data give a broad picture of 
what type of austerity (if any) has been implemented at the local government level. 
Overall, local revenues and expenditures have been increasing since 1962 in real terms 
(see Figure 1). The growth was slower between 1977 and 1982 when local fiscal stress 
and cutbacks were widespread, but both expenditures and revenues recovered after 
1982. This growth continued until 2002. Revenues continued to grow between 2002 
and 2007, but expenditure growth dramatically slowed down. In the 2007-2012 period, 
both revenues and expenditures decreased in real terms. This is the first decrease in 
revenues and expenditures since 1962. These trends still hold when looking at 
expenditures and revenues per capita (not shown), except that expenditures per capita 
started decreasing earlier between 2002 and 2007. 2002 was also the first time there 
was a significant gap between expenditures and revenues in the 1962-2012 period with 
expenditures greater than revenues. In 2007, revenues exceeded expenditures, while in 
2012 expenditures exceeded revenues. As the impact of the 2008 Recession trickled 
down to the local government level, some public finance scholars forecasted a 










Figure 1. Total Revenues and Expenditures of Local Governments, 1962-2012 
 
Data source: US Census Bureau, Census of Governments Historical Data 
Note: Local governments refer to general-purpose local governments (counties, 
municipalities, towns). 
 
 During the 2007-2012 period, revenues dropped more than expenditures, 
mostly due to drops in state aid (see Figure 2). Property taxes, charges, and federal aid 
continued to increase during this period in real terms, while sales tax decreased 
slightly between 2007 and 2012. The federal government provided assistance to local 
governments through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which 
had positive impacts for many cities, but scholars argue this was not enough to meet 
local needs (Johnson 2009). Burtless and Gordon (2011) use data from several sources 
(e.g. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of 
Labor, Employment, and Training Administration, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Census Bureau) and review other scholarly works on the impact of ARRA. They 
conclude that ARRA “reduced the income losses that vulnerable Americans suffered 
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as a result of the recession and made the downturn less severe than it otherwise would 
have been” (p. 289). While states and local governments are better off than they would 
have been without the ARRA, local fiscal stress remains widespread (Congressional 
Budget Office 2010, Warner 2012) and ARRA was a temporary program that faded 
out after 2010. Federal aid increased between 2007 and 2012 from 33.6 billion to 35.8 
billion (in 2009 dollars; 6.5% increase), but on a per capita basis, the increase was 
smaller (111 thousand to 116 thousand in 2009 dollars; 4.5% increase). 
 
Figure 2. Local Government Revenues by Source, 1962-2012 
 
Data source: US Census Bureau, Census of Governments Historical Data 
Note: Local governments refer to general-purpose local governments (counties, 
municipalities, towns) 
 
Various survey data suggest that local governments are using a multi-pronged 
response of changing revenue structures, cutting expenditures (services and staff), and 
exploring alternative service delivery methods. The Census Bureau’s Survey of State 
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and Local Government Employment and Payroll shows full-time equivalent 
employment at the local level decreased by 255,196 jobs between 2007 and 2012. 
According to the 2008-2014 City Fiscal Conditions Surveys published by the National 
League of Cities (NLC), increasing fee levels, increasing the number of fees, and 
increasing property tax rates have consistently been the top three most popular 
revenue actions among local governments. Despite these efforts to supplement 
declining property tax revenues, expenditure cuts at the local level are common. The 
2009-2011 City Fiscal Conditions Surveys by NLC show that the most popular 
expenditure actions were personnel cuts (73%), delay/cancel capital projects (64%), 
cuts in services other than public safety and human services (40%), modify health care 
benefits (32%), and across the board service cuts (21%) (NLC 2011). Another survey 
of 2,214 cities and counties by the International City/County Management Association 
(ICMA) in 2009 shows similar results. 60% of respondents said they deferred capital 
projects, 43% froze salaries, 40% eliminated positions, and 35% reduced services 
(ICMA 2009). Local governments may also look for savings through use of alternative 
delivery methods. According to the City Fiscal Conditions Survey, 23% of 
respondents increased contracting out in 2012, 21% in 2013, and 19% in 2014. 
Survey data offer a snapshot of local government behavior, but do not explain 
why local governments behave this way or the long-term consequences. Empirical 
work on local government behaviors in the aftermath of the Great Recession is limited 
to studies with small samples (e.g. Donald et al. 2014; Nelson 2012; Peck 2012; 
Skidmore and Scorsone 2011) or periods that may not fully capture the impacts of the 
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Recession (e.g. Lobao and Adua 2011; Lobao et al. 2014; Zafra-Gomez et al. 2013). 
This dissertation project has the following objectives: 
 Objective 1: Describe how economic and fiscal pressures after the Great 
Recession shape local government choices about service provision and 
delivery methods. 
 Objective 2: Describe how state policy, demography, and economy shape local 
government revenue structures (reliance on property taxes and charges). 
 Objective 3: Explain how politics shape local government choices and the 
long-term consequences for local governments’ role as service providers. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
This dissertation has two purposes. First, update empirical findings on local 
government behavior during times of fiscal stress with post-Great Recession data, 
particularly with a focus on state-local relationships. Second, build a theory of local 
government behavior – pragmatic municipalism – that overcomes the agency-structure 
dualism in previous theories. My theory of pragmatic municipalism identifies the 
various constraints that local governments must operate within and possibilities for 
local government agency. 
Findings from previous studies may have limited implications for today’s local 
government responses for several reasons. First, the relationship between higher levels 
of government, especially the state level, and local governments have shifted. Trends 
in intergovernmental aid reflect this shift. While federal aid decreased from 1977 to 
1992, state aid continued to increase until 2002 (see Figure 2). In other words, when 
localities were experiencing fiscal stress in the 1970s and 1980s, state aid was a 
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significant source of revenue that was increasing. Today, localities are seeing cuts in 
state aid. 
While resources at the local level have decreased, responsibilities have 
increased. The 1996 Welfare Reform Act increased welfare responsibilities of states, 
and in some places, these responsibilities have been further devolved to the local level 
(Weir 1997). Nathan (1996) noted sharp increases in state to local devolution in the 
1990s, and Warner (2001) and Xu and Warner (2016) argue the pressures on local 
governments to play a redistributive role, as well as a developmental role (Peterson 
1981), may have increased due to further devolution. 
Even though local governments have always been “creatures of the state,” 
some argue there has been further restriction of city power by state governments in 
recent years (Bowman and Kearney 2012). Peck (2014) argues the politics of austerity 
after the Great Recession has encouraged state governments to push down fiscal stress 
to the local level. 
Although studies of federalism have looked at devolution pressures and their 
outcomes, they primarily study federal-state relationships. Weissert and Ice (2014) 
describe state-local relationships as the “stepchild” of the three subfields of state 
politics, urban politics, and economics/fiscal federalism. Thus, studies of state-local 
relationships tend to use theories of federal-state relationships without recognizing the 
challenges unique to local governments. For example, local governments have little 
protection of their legal, political, or fiscal power and this lack of protection translates 
to little ability to push back on unfunded state mandates (Berman 2003). Previous 
studies also miss the publicness of governments, and the constraints that are especially 
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heightened for local governments. For example, Levine (1978) suggested that, like 
private business, in the early stages of fiscal stress, local governments could cut 
essential services to demonstrate the organization’s importance. However, essential 
services may be mandated or local governments may fear voters’ responses, limiting 
local governments from engaging in such strategic behavior. In fact, cutting essential 
services is likely to encourage out-migration of residents and businesses, exacerbating 
fiscal stress. This possibility of out-migration is less concerning for state or federal 
governments; it is easier to leave a city than a state or country. This dissertation is one 
of the few studies that contributes to empirical knowledge of state-local relationships, 
such as Lobao et al. (2014), Lobao and Adua (2011), Warner (2001), Warner and Pratt 
(2005), and Xu and Warner (2015, 2016). 
Second, the relationship between the public sector and private sector has 
changed. Scholars noted how the financial crisis of 2008 became a public sector crisis 
after the Great Recession (Blyth 2013; Peck 2014; Thompson 2012), and an 
intensification of using the public sector to promote private capital (or 
“financialization”; Fine and Hall 2012). Governments, both central and local, are 
much more vulnerable to changes in financial markets as many governments have 
“acquired vast new assets, in the form of major investments in the banks and other 
financial institutions” (Pollitt 2010, p. 9). For example, public pension fund 
contributions rose as the stock market fell.  And in many states public pension funds 
lost significant amounts of money after investing in junk securities following 
misleading ratings (Viswanatha and Freifeld 2015). 
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Lastly, the relationship between local governments and citizens has become 
more complicated. Several demographic changes are happening across the US, such as 
aging population and increasing racial and ethnic diversity, that require 
communications between local governments and citizens so that local governments 
can respond to these changing needs and preferences. However, the overall sentiment 
towards governments and taxes has become more hostile. Scholars point out that 
people have less patience, want quick answers, and that the 2008 financial crisis has 
been highly politicized (Boin et al. 2008; Pandey 2010; Rosenthal 2003). The 
demographic forces that increase the demand for public services, and the hostile 
responses to the service providers (i.e. governments) are offsetting. One possible 
explanation is the politics of scarcity that “exacerbat[es] the struggle for smaller pieces 
of a shrinking pie” (Edsall 2012, p. 2), and how reminders of scarcity affect citizens. 
Levine (2015) finds the rhetoric of economic insecurity reminds us of the scarcity of 
our resources (both time and finances), and lead to less political action. As local 
government resources decrease (e.g. state aid, property taxes), the competition for 
these resources may increase, and the language of scarcity, which reminds people how 
little they have, could make them less likely to support tax increases, undermining the 
long term sustainability of local government finance. 
 
Literature Review 
I engage in the debate on the behavior of local governments within the context 
of fiscal stress and limited resources. What choices do local governments have and 
what shapes their decisions? Public administration studies on cutback management 
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emphasize the managerial role of local governments (e.g. Levine 1978), while 
progressive planning theories emphasize the public-minded leadership of local 
governments (e.g. Clavel 2013). In the recent post-recession period, political 
geographers see local governments becoming austerity machines that cut and privatize 
services due to macro-level political and economic forces (Peck 2014). This debate on 
local government behavior is a question of local government agency – strong agency 
in the form of progressive planning or austerity machines shaped by the structure of 
scarce resources. I use pragmatism theories that resolve the artificial agency-structure 
dualism (Farjoun et al. 2015) and apply them to analyzing how local governments 
deliver services and raise revenues. 
 
Local Government Agency or Structure? 
Cutback Management. Much of the public management literature on local 
government behavior under fiscal stress builds on Charles Levine’s (1978, 1979) work 
on cutback management and emphasizes strong local agency. Levine (1978) defined 
cutback management as “managing organizational change towards lower levels of 
resource consumption and organizational activity” (p. 180). Levine argued that the 
public manager would act strategically and adopt different sets of tactics, depending 
on the cause of decline and the purpose of the tactic: “resistance” or “smoothing.” 
He identified four causes of decline, depending on the location of the cause 
(i.e. internal or external) and the nature of the cause (i.e. political or 
economic/technical). The first cause is political vulnerability (internal, political), 
meaning the organization lacks internal capacity to resist environmental pressures of 
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budget decrements and pressures to shrink. Some examples are lack of expertise or 
history of poor performance. The second type is organizational atrophy (internal, 
economic/technical). This is a decline in internal performance and mostly due to poor 
management (e.g. inconsistent and perverse incentives, role confusion, weak 
oversight, high turnover, etc.). The third cause is problem depletion (external, 
political) wherein the problem that the organization is supposed to address has been 
solved, alleviated, or become less popular politically. The fourth cause is 
environmental entropy (external, economic/technical). This means the environment’s 
capacity to support the organization erodes. Examples are financially troubled cities 
with shrinking economic bases or market and technological shifts. 
Levine argued that managers would try to resist decline at first, but soon 
switch to smoothing tactics since resistance tactics carry the risk of losing control over 
where cuts will take place. Resistance tactics include educating the public about the 
importance of the organization, cutting an important service temporarily to 
demonstrate the organization’s importance, luring new public and private investments, 
adopting user charges and experimenting with less costly service delivery. Smoothing 
tactics include cutting low prestige programs, cutting programs to politically weak 
clients, installing rational choice techniques (e.g. zero-base budgeting), and deferring 
maintenance. Thus, Levine’s model shows public organization managers as rational 
and strategic decision makers who focus on the survival of the organization. 
Levine (1978)’s model is called a step-by-step approach to emphasize the 
sequential characteristic of local government actions in response to decline. Similarly, 
Wolman (1980, 1983) argued that local governments adopt a set of hierarchical 
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choices during times of fiscal stress. Building on systems theory, he argues that local 
governments try to maintain stability in their environment (e.g. relationship with 
public employees and their unions). Thus, they first turn to strategies that are the least 
disruptive, such as drawing down reserves or utilizing one-time revenue. If they need 
to cut, they use more across-the-board cuts than targeted cuts, with service cuts as a 
last resort. Similarly, Pagano (1988) found cities are able to adjust and adapt to their 
environment, mainly through cost-shifting mechanisms, such as user fees and special 
assessments, requiring developers to finance more infrastructure, and sharing capital 
costs with state and other local governments. 
Jick and Murray (1982) also emphasize the key decision-maker’s perception of 
fiscal stress. Based on a literature review of organization decline in the public sector, 
they argue that two factors are the most important determinants for strategic responses 
to financial resource reductions. First, whether the key decision-makers perceive the 
cause of cuts to be rational or political, and second, how they perceive their position in 
the power hierarchy vis a vis the funding agencies, other relevant external bodies, and 
other internal groups and individuals. Once the cutback decisions are made, crisis 
behavior (i.e. reactions to the cuts) is mostly determined by the severity and time 
pressure of the crisis. 
Related to all of these theories is the possibility of innovation. Zaltman et al. 
(1973), March and Simon (1958), Cyert and March (1963) hypothesized that 
environmental stress will push organizations to search for solutions to cope, leading to 
innovation. However, these theories were mostly based on studies of private 
organizations. Levine (1979) pointed out that analytic capacity is usually developed 
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when public organizations have slack resources. Thus, he predicts that due to lack of 
resources during times of decline and the tendency for people to resist change in times 
of austerity, there will be little innovation. Clark (1994) used survey data from the 
Fiscal Austerity and Innovation Project on cities with populations of 25,000 and above 
and examined city innovation behavior in the 1980s and early 1990s. He found that 
there is no systematic relationship between the degree of fiscal strain and propensity to 
innovate. In addition, he found that innovation is not necessarily confined to affluent 
cities. 
Progressive Cities. Another body of work emphasizes local government 
agency in an explicitly benevolent way. Communicative Planning Theory (CPT) 
shows the possibility of progressive cities emerging at the local level. CPT purported 
to solve problems of ignoring community needs and preferences through a focus on 
communication. Sager presents arguments to legitimize CPT based on Habermas' 
theory of communicative action (Habermas 1998): 1) CPT can lead to the "right 
decisions" (p. 30) by mechanisms of the Condorcet jury theorem2 2) CPT promotes 
anti-paternalism by encouraging deliberative democracy and 3) CPT produces 
relational goods. 
However, social choice theory already showed difficulty in aggregating 
preferences through voting (Sager 2002). Thus while the Condorcet Theorem suggests 
                                                 
2 Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet 1785) gives the probability that a jury will 
arrive at the correct answer to a problem. The Theorem implies that it is possible to 
overcome the problem of citizen ignorance and disinterest leading to less than ideal 
decisions because a group of individuals is more likely to choose the correct answer 
than any single individual (McLean and Hewitt 1994).  
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that collective decision making might lead to better outcomes, the issue of collective 
action remains. Moreover, critics argue that CPT has been used for undemocratic 
outcomes and to legitimize neoliberal policies (Purcell 2008, 2009) because it ignores 
outcomes and power imbalances, while emphasizing consensus. 
Democratic theorists have pointed out the important role of conflict in 
democracy. For example, Mouffe (2005), recognizing that the social will always have 
the potential of being conflictual and antagonistic, calls for an agonistic pluralism. The 
goal is to transform antagonism (struggle between enemies) to agonism (struggle 
between adversaries). Adversaries are defined as those “whose ideas we combat, but 
whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question” (Mouffe 2000, p. 102). 
Wolin (1996) also defines democracy as a system that emerges from constant struggle. 
He argues that so-called stable forms of democracy based on a constitution tend to 
solidify existing structures that allow elites to exploit resources while excluding the 
demos. His definitions of a democracy require revolutions that “radically enlarge . . . 
the circle of political participants to include the active involvement of social classes 
hitherto excluded or marginal” (p. 37). The local could be a space for such active 
involvement. 
In urban theory, cities have been seen as leaders of progressivism. Clavel 
(2013) called these places progressive cities, which mostly emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s. He defines a progressive city as one that adopts redistributive policies and has 
wider public participation. Some examples are Hartford, Cleveland, Madison, 
Berkeley, Santa Monica, Santa Cruz, Burlington, Chicago (under Mayor Harold 
Washington), Boston (under Mayor Raymond Flynn), and San Francisco. Progressive 
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cities are not the norm, but Clavel presents them as places where we might find 
alternative visions for cities. Recently, Loh (2016) found some evidence of pushback 
through planning processes in her study of six Michigan cities under emergency 
management. Planning processes functioned as a space for public participation when 
state imposed emergency management bypassed democratic procedures. However, she 
warns that structural forces like demography and lack of growth pressures cannot be 
solved by the city alone. 
Thus, the question of whether progressive cities can be a sustainable vision 
remains. Clavel (2013) mentions rent control in Santa Monica and Berkeley as an 
example of progressive cities in action. While rent control has some benefits of 
potentially slowing down gentrification and allowing the poor to spend their income 
on other goods, there are costs as well. In general, price controls lead to a shortage in 
the good (in this case, housing), and often deterioration of the housing quality as 
landlords see little incentive to keep their property in good condition. Another 
example that Clavel uses for progressive city action is Chicago’s implementation of 
industrial policy that favored retention of manufacturing jobs. Again, there are benefits 
to policies that can maintain jobs, but a policy that artificially preserves jobs without 
actually reforming the work force (e.g. better education) can lead to large costs in the 
future. 
Austerity Urbanism and Growth Machines. Austerity urbanism theories 
emphasize the power that structures have over local governments. Cities have faced 
fiscal stress before in the 1970s and used cutback management to cope, but scholars 
have emphasized the radically different conditions after the Great Recession wherein 
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service cuts are becoming part of the “new normal” (Martin et al. 2012). Scorsone and 
Plerhoples (2010) identified a new era of cutback management that emerged in the 
early 2000s. In this new era, local governments relied more on budget cuts and 
restructuring, rather than tax increases. This is directly opposed to what cutback 
management theories say; local governments will first turn to least disruptive 
strategies, and service cuts are last resorts. 
Urban and political geographers have described these changes as the rise of 
austerity urbanism (Peck 2012), austerity machines, or austerity regimes (Donald et al. 
2014). An austerity machine is a coalition of public and private actors that use 
austerity measures – often bypassing democratic processes – to decrease the level of 
public services, public infrastructure, and public employment, either by directly 
cutting local government aid, limiting revenue raising capacity, by decreasing 
collective bargaining rights, or reducing and privatizing services (Donald et al. 2014; 
Peck 2012). Some examples are Detroit’s unelected emergency administrators 
restructuring public employment terms and privatizing public assets, and the activities 
of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the Tea Party to rewrite 
state legislation to limit local government power (Peck 2014). Thus, the austerity 
regime is both multi-sector and multilevel. Multi-sector because it includes actors 
from the business sector and civil society. Multilevel because it includes actors from 
local, as well as state and federal government who push down political blame and 
fiscal burdens to the local level (Peck 2014). 
Austerity urbanism is an emergent phenomenon that is an intensification of 
neoliberal urbanism (Peck 2012). Neoliberal urbanism refers to a particular type of 
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urbanism driven by programs, such as “deregulation, privatization, liberalization and 
enhanced fiscal austerity” (Peck et al. 2009, p. 58). The ultimate goal is to promote a 
“good business climate” (ibid. p. 63) in cities, usually through “place-marketing, 
enterprise and empowerment zones, local tax abatements, urban development 
corporations, public-private partnerships, and new forms of local boosterism to 
workfare policies, property-redevelopment schemes, business-incubator projects, new 
strategies of social control, policing, and surveillance” (Brenner and Theodore 2002, 
p. 21). However, neoliberal urbanism is not simply about making profits.  
Critics of neoliberal urbanism emphasize that it includes an element of 
protecting some while exploiting others, exacerbating structural inequalities. For 
example, Jones and Ward (2002) point out: 
 
the neoliberal project of institutional creation is no longer oriented 
simply towards the promotion of market-driven capitalist growth; it 
is also oriented toward the establishment of new flanking 
mechanisms and modes of crisis displacement through which to 
insulate powerful economic actors from the manifold failures of the 
market, the state, and governance that are persistently generated 
within a neoliberal political framework. (p. 27) 
 
Peck et al. (2009) write, “The overarching goal of [neoliberal] policy experiments is to 
mobilize city space as an arena both for market-oriented economic growth and for elite 
 33 
 
consumption practices, while at the same time securing order and control amongst 
marginalized populations” (p. 58). 
One difference between austerity machines and the older regimes (Stone 1989) 
and growth machines (Logan and Molotch 1987) lies in the agency of the city. Regime 
theory argues that local governments form regimes in order to increase their capacity 
to govern (Stone 1989). There is a common goal that brings benefits to both the public 
and private actors. Even though critics of the growth machine say that the wider public 
rarely gains anything from these coalitions (Logan and Molotch 1987), at least there is 
the promise of the public benefitting by increasing their home values and/or increasing 
revenues for the local government, which can potentially lead to more or better quality 
services. In contrast, austerity machines cut service expenditures as well as the 
management capacity of local governments (Peck 2014). Furthermore, if the 
deterioration of services is capitalized in home values, this can harm homeowners as 
one of their largest assets (i.e. homes) loses value. 
The key difference between austerity machines and growth machines is 
financialization. Financialization is broadly defined as “the increasing role of financial 
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation 
of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005, p. 3). Austerity urbanism 
can be an example of financialized local governance. The ends of a “common goal” 
that can bring more tax revenues for the local government in the past growth machine 
are gone. Instead, the public only stands to lose and the local government has little to 
no agency. The only gains within the austerity urbanism framework are the profits 
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from privatizing services that accrue to the private contractor and the political gains of 
small government proponents. 
A limitation of neoliberal theories is their narrow focus on description and 
critiques, and failure to suggest real alternatives. In the words of Ferguson (2010), 
neoliberalization theories have been too focused on the “anti” while neglecting the 
“pro.” He calls for a pragmatic approach that distinguishes neoliberal technologies of 
government from a class-based ideological project. Ferguson says that neoliberal 
technologies are tools that we could use for a wide variety of purposes. Ferguson 
emphasizes, “With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines 
or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do” (p. 183). As such, 
Ferguson brings back the agency of public leaders. Warner and Clifton (2014) point to 
user fees as an example of using market tools to achieve public outcomes. They 
suggest that some places are “riding the wave” of marketization to avoid service cuts. 
Another example is social impact bonds that link private investment for social 
intervention programs by rewarding investors when beneficial public goals are 
achieved. For example, private investors could invest in a prisoner re-entry program 
that reduces recidivism. When recidivism rates decrease (the desired outcome), 
investors receive payments. Warner (2013) cautions that social impact bonds fail to 
attract private investment without substantial additional guarantees and can further 
financialize human development services. This is similar to what Mayer and Kunkel 
(2011) have called “neoliberalism with a human touch” (p. 221). Mayer and Kunkel 
(2011) agree with Ferguson (2010) that neoliberal technologies can be used for a 
variety of purposes, but caution that there is a fine line between whether a tool is used 
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for neoliberal purposes or not. Lake (2016) describes this as the reversal of means and 
ends in social policy. That is, while the traditional bonds were using private capital for 
public purposes, social impact bonds are using social policies for the purpose of 
financial profits. The government’s role has shifted from providing public goods to 
creating financial profits. 
It is difficult to empirically identify austerity urbanism, as opposed to efficient 
management, by just using finance data. If expenditures and revenue decreased, we do 
not know if this is because the local government became more efficient, or if they are 
just cutting despite steady levels of need or even increased levels of need. A 
qualitative study can provide a more nuanced picture of local governments’ responses.  
 
Overcoming Agency-Structure Dualism: Pragmatic Municipalism 
I use a lens of pragmatism to overcome the simplistic agency-structure dualism 
in studying local governments. Pragmatism is a strand of philosophy that emphasizes 
the practical consequences of accepting a proposition or its usefulness as the criteria 
for accepting or rejecting ideas. I use the term "pragmatic municipalism" to describe 
local governments behaving in ways that are consistent with the pragmatism theory. 
This is not the first application of pragmatism to local government studies, and as such 
I provide a brief summary of the recent dialogue in the field. 
Administration & Society has been a major venue for discussions of 
pragmatism and public administration. The first round of debates in 2000 were 
centered on the historical relationship between pragmatism and American public 
administration, and whether there should be a closer relationship. The second round of 
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debates in 2004 were centered on two strands of pragmatism: classical and neo (also 
known as linguistic pragmatism, postmodern pragmatism, or Rortyan pragmatism). 
Reviewing these old debates, Kasdan (2015) recently pointed out the two types of 
pragmatism are not necessarily in conflict, but rather perspectives along a spectrum. 
Nevertheless, most of the discussion in this paper refers to classical pragmatism, based 
on its longer history and more explicit linkages to public administration (Ansell 2011; 
Dieleman 2014; Shields 2004, 2008; Harmon 2006). 
 Scholars have argued for the use of pragmatism in the field of public 
administration (Ansell 2011; Dieleman 2014; Evans 2000, 2010; Harmon 2006; 
Hildebrand 2008; Shields 2004), but these scholars also lament the sparsity of 
pragmatism lenses in theoretical works and in practice (Deieleman 2014; Kasdan 
2015; Whetsell and Shields 2011). Pragmatism focuses on problem-solving as central 
for understanding human behavior, and the following are the key features of 
pragmatism (Farjoun et al. 2015; Shields 2004, 2008; Webb 2004). Pragmatism, like 
positivism, believes there is a real world that exists independent of any person’s 
thought. However, pragmatism rejects foundationalism or the Cartesian approach to 
inquiry that holds a few propositions as being the absolute truth. Instead, pragmatism 
subscribes to a fallibilist approach that every proposition has the possibility of being 
false, and as such, any “solution” is provisional. As for deciding on this provisional 
solution, pragmatists envisioned communities of inquiry that use scientific attitudes. 
The scientific attitude refers to using working hypotheses for collecting and 
interpreting data or facts. It is important to note pragmatists were different from 
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positivists in that they acknowledge the role of values and ideals in these processes, 
rather than the fact-value dualism that positivists emphasize. 
 The debates regarding pragmatism and public administration are not 
conclusive, but I use this lens because it is a useful way to understand local 
government behaviors. This is largely due to two themes of pragmatism. First, 
pragmatism resolves several dualisms as it holds pluralism as one of its key tenets. 
The community of inquiry relies on both expert and non-expert knowledge and 
quantitative and qualitative knowledge. This allows us to overcome the agency-
structural dualism. Previous theories of local government behaviors emphasized either 
structure or agency, painting an incomplete picture. As Evans (2010) summarizes, “By 
applying the lens of pragmatism, we can watch the interplay between human 
experience and the structures of accepted practice (p. 870). Giddens (1984) also 
overcame the structure-agency dualism by arguing that although agents work within 
structures, agents change structures as well. However, Farjoun et al. (2015) point out 
that Giddens ends up dissolving structure and agency, while pragmatism allows for the 
two to be distinct yet related. For the field of local government studies, pragmatism 
emphasizes the importance of both theory and practice (Shields 2004; Whetsell and 
Shields 2011). Unlike the positivist stance of theory guiding (and thus being above) 
practice, pragmatism sees the two interacting and guiding each other. 
This links to the second theme of pragmatism – recursiveness. Pragmatism 
sees the world as processes, and thus there is no truly independent event. An event is 
always linked to a prior event and so on and so forth (Farjoun et al. 2015). This is 
what Dewey called the “reflexive arc” (1896/1998) that links cause and effect in 
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iterative cycles (Salem and Shields 2011). Shields (1996) argued this fits well with the 
iterative processes within public administration. Salem and Shields (2011) applied this 
lens of iterative processes to suggest one explanation of why austerity may become 
widespread after the recession: 
 
Legislatures cut budgets (often citing government waste), and executive 
agencies then struggle to provide the same services. Administrators 
make adjustments and demonstrate that their agencies could do as much 
with less. Ironically, demonstrating “more with less” may feed further 
calls for reduced taxes, privatization, and further budget reductions. The 
cycle begins again…Each recursive loop leads to greater tightening of 
the processes, removing more and more slack public administrators 
could use for other goals. (p. 127) 
 
 Scholars have noted hints of pragmatism in public administration and public 
finance theories before (Snider 2000; Shields 2008; Stever 2000). Charles Lindblom 
(1959)’s theory of muddling through in public decision-making and Herbert Simon 
(1957)’s bounded rationality/satisficing model in which decision-makers choose a 
satisfactory and sufficient choice, rather than the ideal choice are some examples. 
Recently, Nelson (2012) used the bounded rationality model to explain local 
government responses to fiscal crises in sixteen municipalities. However, Simon 
(1946) emphasized the fact-value and theory-practice split by arguing that the existing 
principles of public administration were mere proverbs.  
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Bartle and Shields (2013) specifically call for a pragmatism lens in the study 
of public finance as many existing theories of public finance have been normative and 
based on assumptions that do not match reality. For example, Musgrave’s (1959) 
suggestion for the division of responsibilities among different branches of government 
does not align with reality. This dissertation shows that the assumptions of an 
autonomous local government responding to the preferences of a citizenry who make 
rational choices about tax and service bundles does not hold in the post-Great 
Recession world of shifting structural constraints (e.g. state-local relationships, 
government-business relationships, government-citizen relationships). Again, there 
have been traces of pragmatism in public finance. Walker (1930) wrote: 
 
To understand municipal budget making it is necessary to visualize 
this tremendous pressure that is being exerted from all sides - the 
pressure of organized interests, or ambitious department heads, of 
civic groups, of official prejudices, of the political potency of a low 
tax rate, even of public opinion where not represented by any of the 
above. The final budget will be the resultant of these forces and not 
the outcome of a dispassionate evaluation of the various functions. 
(p. 29, 47-48) 
 
The austerity urbanism view denies local agency, while progressive planning 
and cutback management theories do not pay enough attention to structural 
constraints. Pragmatic municipalism argues structures and agents shape and are shaped 
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by each other in a "recursive loop." While local governments are “creatures of the 
state,” they are not entirely shaped by pressures from state governments. They are 
focused on problem-solving, for example the problem of shrinking resources and need 
to maintain or increase services, and exercise their agency within structural 
constraints. 
Bounding Local Government Agency 
Based on previous literature, I focus on three factors that shape the boundaries of 
local government agency: state policy, demography, and economy. This section 
reviews empirical studies that show how these factors shape local government 
behaviors. 
State Policy. In a multilevel governance system, state policy is an important 
contextual factor. Dillon’s Treatise in 1872 defined cities as “creatures of the state,” 
completely subject to state authority. Frug and Barron (2008) go as far to say there is 
no such thing as local autonomy. Local choices are always shaped by state policies 
that affect inter-local relationships and public-private relationships. 
 States can impose further fiscal burdens on cities through policies that restrict 
local tax raising power (e.g. tax and expenditure limitations or TELs). TELs have been 
used as political tools to show governments are trying to promote economic growth. 
However, Deller et al. (2012) found that TELs imposed on local governments do not 
promote state economic growth, and in fact, have a weak negative impact. Based on a 
study of TELs in the 1970s and 1980s, Joyce and Mullins (1991) found local TELs are 
often accompanied by increased state aid to localities and increased state expenditures. 
Thus, states may offset the effect of revenue decrease at the local level. 
 41 
 
 Fiscal federalism argues that higher-level governments, either federal or state, 
should play a role in equalization and redistribution (Oates and Schwab 1991). 
However, the austerity policies in the aftermath of the Great Recession have included 
states pushing down fiscal burdens to the local level (Peck 2014), and some argue that 
cities have experienced decreased authority in the past decade at the hands of their 
state governments (Bowman and Kearney 2012). Based on participant observation in 
Wisconsin municipalities from 2007 to 2011, Cramer (2014) showed how Wisconsin 
Governor Scott Walker was able to use the rhetoric of blaming cities and unions to 
push his controversial budget measures. These budget measures included ending 
collective bargaining rights and increasing employee contributions for health and 
pension benefits. 
Managerial theories from public administration also emphasize the role of state 
policy, particularly in the form of mandates. Downs and Rocke (1984) discuss three 
theories of budgetary decision-making in response to declining real revenue: 
bureaucratic process theory, interest group politics theory, and managerial theory. 
Bureaucratic process theory argues that responses to fiscal stress will follow 
incrementalism (Lindblom 1959; Wildavsky 1964): small changes on the margin. 
Schick (1983) applied this response to budgetary contraction, and called it 
“decrementalism,” which entails across-the-board cuts. Interest group politics theory 
says the response is a function of distribution of power among internal and external 
actors. Managerial theory says mandatory or uncontrollable expenditures shape the 
outcomes as government managers try to cope with the “rising cost of operating a 
permanent bureaucracy and maintaining current service levels in the face of inflation 
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and structural change (e.g., change in demographics or industrial base)” (Downs and 
Rocke 1984, p. 340). Using longitudinal data from Pittsburgh (1943-1976) and San 
Diego (1949-1978), Downs and Rocke (1984) find support for the managerial theory 
that emphasizes the “relative controllability” of expenditure categories. Morgan and 
Pammer (1988) and Pammer (1990) also report unstructured responses during 
retrenchment processes; however, they consistently find that the city manager or 
administrator’s perception of the fiscal situation is an important factor in these 
decisions.3 
A recent study by Nelson (2012) supports these arguments about crisis 
behavior. This study examined sixteen US municipalities selected through a process of 
stratified random sampling from four regions in the US. Based on document analyses 
and interviews, Nelson (2012) found that local governments’ behavior between 2007 
and 2011 was strategic and that they do not blindly follow a set of neoliberal 
proscriptions (i.e. cutting and privatizing services). Instead, she found that local 
government managers follow a bounded rationality model; they adhere to a rational 
sequence of decisions in the early stages, but as the economic situation gets worse, 
their behaviors become less predictable and more divergent. Local responses were 
very similar in the beginning of the Recession; trying to increase revenue through fee 
increases, federal grants, and drawing from reserves, while cutting costs through 
                                                 
3 Local government managers may be in the best position to assess local situations, but 
based on a survey of local government officials in Wisconsin, Maher and Deller 
(2007, 2011) found no statistical relationship between officials’ perceptions of fiscal 
stress and empirical measures of fiscal stress. Whether this is a shortcoming of 
existing empirical measures, limitations of local officials' knowledge, or strategic 
behavior in answering such questions is unclear. 
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hiring freezes. However, as the level of stress increased, local responses started to 
diverge depending on state government restrictions (e.g. tax limitations) and interest 
group involvement. 
 Regulation theory and state rescaling theory emphasize broader shifts in the 
roles and responsibilities in a multilevel governance system. Jessop (1993) argues that 
there was a shift from the Keynesian Welfare State to a Schumpetarian Workfare State 
since the 1970s. This Schumpetarian Workfare State focuses on competitiveness rather 
than welfare as the pressures of globalization create winners and losers in the global 
market. Jessop (1992) writes about the hollowing out of the state that leads to powers 
being passed upward to supranational bodies while other powers are devolved down in 
a process Swyngedouw (1992) has called “glocalization.” 
 State rescaling theory focuses on this change in the location of nation state 
power and authority. State rescaling theory argues that these processes will lead to a 
more diverse landscape at the local level. Under the Fordist period (1950s-1960s), 
Brenner (2004) argues spatial Keynesianism, which is the central state’s effort to 
direct resources to poorer regions or places was widespread. Both Brenner (2004) and 
Jessop (2003) suggest that globalization has transformed the state to be more 
competitive, and now the state is more interested in enhancing the developmental 
capacity of select places. Since they want to make sure these regions and places are 
competitive in the international market, they will pick the most promising places, 
rather than places with the most need. However, Cox (2009) questions the extent to 
which this transformation can be applied to the US where spatial Keynesianism was 
never that strong. 
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 State rescaling theory says whether localities follow neoliberal policies must 
be empirically determined (Peck et al. 2009), and predicts outcomes will be more 
complex as localities use both vertical (changing scope of services) and horizontal 
(linking with non-state actors) policy-related activities (Büchs 2009). Lobao et al. 
(2014) found pressures from state and federal governments and competition with other 
local governments explain the use of business attraction policies, privatization, and 
levels of social service provision, and Xu and Warner (2015) find the relationship 
between state policies and local employment growth vary by region. Since 
institutional capacity and context vary by locality, inequality among places may 
increase. 
Demography. Demography has significant implications for local stress. 
Recently, scholars have examined how demography affects local stress in the context 
of “shrinking cities” or “declining cities” (Hollander 2011). For example, the problem 
of vacant land can be the result of a city that is losing population (Ganning and Tighe 
2014). Bowman and Pagano (2000) found that population loss is correlated with more 
abandoned structures. They argue that population and a city’s inability to expand its 
political boundary to capture growing regions explains the rise in vacant land or 
abandoned structures, rather than simply regional or economic conditions. Manville 
and Kuhlmann (2016) examine cities that lost population between 1980 and 2010, and 
show a vicious cycle of population loss leading to increased needs and decreased fiscal 
capacity. 
In addition to overall population, the population structure matters. For 
example, elderly and children have higher service needs and can increase local 
 45 
 
expenditure burdens (Wallace 2012). Other demographic factors such as poverty, 
unemployment, and racial characteristics also have implications for local expenditures 
and are spread out unequally across space. Suburbs have traditionally enjoyed higher 
income and lower poverty while urban core and rural areas have had higher poverty. 
However, recently, the growth of nonwhite population in the suburbs outpaced that of 
the core urban areas between 2000 and 2010 (Frey 2011) and the suburbs have the 
largest and fastest growing poor population (Kneebone and Berube 2013). Rural 
places have consistently had lower resources due to the physical distance from centers 
of economic activity (Partridge and Rickman 2008). Austerity policies imposed after 
the Great Recession can exacerbate these already existing inequalities since they are 
particularly harmful to the poor and children (Donald et al. 2014). 
 Overall, the US is becoming older and more diverse. The suburbs are 
becoming poorer, while some urban cities are shrinking, and rural places remain poor. 
Some see these demographic trends as an exciting opportunity (e.g. Ehrenhalt 2012; 
Frey 2015), while others preach caution about the potential outcomes (e.g. Lichter 
2013). On the ground, there is more variety in demographic trends. For example, while 
the total US population is growing and aging, places like Detroit, Cleveland, and 
Buffalo are shrinking, and places like Salt Lake City and San Bernardino have a larger 
child population than elderly as a percentage of total population. Poverty rates are 
growing faster in the suburbs as a whole, but in upstate New York, poverty rates 
continued to grow faster in the inner cities (Bacheller 2015). These unequal 
demographic trends at the local level signal unequal stress for localities. 
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 What can cities do in response to demographic pressures that signal increased 
need? Cities can either increase their capacity to respond to needs, decrease the level 
of need, or ignore these signals. Clavel (2013) identified progressive cities, such as 
Berkeley, Burlington, Cleveland, Hartford, and Santa Monica, that adopted 
redistributive policies to respond to need.  However, these progressive cities remain 
the exception, rather than the norm. More often, cities try to attract wealth, capital, and 
businesses (Hackworth 2013; Harvey 1989; Peck et al. 2009; Peterson 1981) to 
increase their fiscal capacity, while simultaneously trying to exclude people with high 
need through zoning or other political tools. An example is “municipal 
underbounding” (Aiken 1987): municipalities trying to exclude populations with high 
need or low incomes from being incorporated into the jurisdiction so that they are 
excluded from local services and elections. Lichter et al. (2007) found evidence of 
municipal underbounding along white-black racial lines among rural towns in the 
South. While wealthier cities have this option of keeping out the poor, declining cities 
do not. 
Economy. The local economy affects the local tax base and fiscal capacity. In 
the 2008 Recession, the housing market was particularly important. In several places 
where foreclosure stress was high, municipal fiscal stress followed (e.g. places in 
Nevada and Florida; Justice and Scorsone 2013). Scholars have pointed out that 
foreclosures not only lead to financial, psychological, and social instability for 
families (Ross and Squires 2011), but also to lower property values (Leonard and 
Murdoch 2009; Lin et al. 2009) and higher crime rates (Raleigh and Galster 2015). For 
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cities, this means less revenue or higher tax effort (since they need to increase the tax 
rate) and increased expenditure pressures due to increased community need. 
 Regime theory does not specifically address local government responses to 
fiscal stress, but gives implications for local government behavior. This theory still 
recognizes the agency of local governments, but expands its scope to include the role 
of other local actors in local governance. Regime theory starts from the premise that 
there is a division of labor between the market and the state (Elkin 1987), which leads 
to fragmentation of power. Local governments have legitimacy and policy-making 
authority, while market actors have the capital to generate jobs, tax revenue, and 
finance public projects. Thus, local governments cannot govern the city alone. Stone 
(1989) describes the regimes as “informal arrangements by which public bodies and 
private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing 
decisions” (p. 6). He writes that local governments pursue these alliances to increase 
their “capacity to act” (p. 229). While Stone (2005) recognizes that “in the US…, 
business enjoys ready-made advantages as a willing and able participant in priority 
agendas” (p. 315), regime theory does not limit the definition of private actors to 
business actors. Private actors may also include neighborhood organizations. 
A more specific version of regime theory that focuses on the role of business 
actors is the growth machine theory. Logan and Molotch (1987) argued that land-
based elites or place entrepreneurs drive local decisions. These entrepreneurs want to 
maximize the exchange value of land while residents want to maximize use value. A 
growth machine is formed when the interests of place entrepreneurs (for profit) and 
local governments (for revenue) converge on the shared goal of growth. These 
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decisions are presented to the public as being beneficial for everyone. However, 
Logan and Molotch (1987) argue that the outcomes often harm the majority of 
residents in the area while bringing economic profits to a few land-based elites. A 
contemporary example is the 2005 Kelo decision. In this Supreme Court case, the City 
of New London used its eminent domain power to acquire private property so that 
Pfizer, a large pharmaceutical company, could build a plant. The City argued that the 
use of eminent domain was justified because the project qualified as an economic 
development project that serves a public purpose (i.e. creating jobs, increasing city 
revenue, and revitalizing the area). Susette Kelo and other property owners sued the 
City, arguing that the Pfizer project does not serve a public purpose. The Supreme 
Court sided with the City. The use of eminent domain for growth is not new, but the 
Kelo Decision signifies a shift in the meaning of public goods. The definition of public 
good was broader, encompassing economic, social and environmental aspects as well 
as public use, but in the Kelo decision, it was mostly about economic gains. 
Local governments pursuing growth has a long history, and given the potential 
benefits to the local government this pursuit may intensify during times of fiscal 
stress. Peterson (1981) drew attention to the environmental constraints in which cities 
operate and argued that cities try to advance their interests by pursuing developmental 
policies to attract business. The underlying assumption is that developmental policies 
allow cities to maintain jobs, capital investment, and tax revenue. Cities will compete 
for upper income taxpayers, who are supposedly more mobile and benefit less from 
local spending. More recently, Kemmet (2003) found that fiscal stress reinforced the 
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growth machine in California as cities continued to pursue pro-growth policies, even 
when citizens did not support them. 
However, this traditional role of local governments pursuing growth may be 
changing. Xu and Warner (2015) found local government efforts (defined as the ratio 
of locally raised revenue to per capita income) had a positive impact on employment 
growth in the 2001 Recession, but not in the 2008 Recession. They hypothesize that as 
state mandates force local governments to do more redistribution, they are left with 
less resources for economic development. Another study by Xu and Warner (2016) on 
US county areas between 2002 and 2007 also indicates that redistribution spending 
may be crowding out economic development spending as local government 
expenditures under devolution are partly driven by local need, rather than solely 
growth as Peterson (1981) argued. 
Summary 
During the 1970s and 1980s when local governments experienced fiscal stress, 
scholars viewed local governments as progressive leaders who prioritize redistribution 
(Clavel 2013), growth machines that prioritize economic growth (Logan and Molotch 
1987), or cutback managers who prioritize survival of the organization (Levine 1978, 
1979). Recently, scholars have seen local governments as austerity machines that cut 
services and prioritize budgets over community needs (Peck 2012, 2014). Using a lens 
of pragmatism, I argue local governments follow pragmatic municipalism, balancing 
community needs and fiscal pressures, to maintain their role as service providers (Kim 
and Warner 2016). My theory of pragmatic municipalism combines previous theories 
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to recognize both local government agency and its structural constraints. Table 1 
presents a summary of these views. 
 




Local government manager will choose strategic, rational 
responses that ensure survival of organization. 
Regime theory & 
growth machine 
Local government will try to make coalitions with non-
government actors, especially business leaders, and 
pursue economic growth. 
Austerity 
urbanism 
Local governments will privatize and cut services and staff. 
State rescaling Local government responses will vary from place to place, 
depending on local context and institutional 
characteristics 
Progressive cities Local governments will respond to local needs and take on 
progressive roles (e.g. redistributive spending). 
Pragmatic 
municipalism 
Local governments use alternative revenue sources and 
service delivery methods (privatization and 
cooperation) to meet community needs. 
 
Previous works highlight the importance of state policy, demography, and 
economy in shaping local government responses (Lobao and Adua 2011; Xu and 
Warner 2015, 2016; Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2009). In my dissertation project, I explore 
how these factors shape local government choices in delivering services and raising 
revenues, and the potential for local government agency. Figure 3 is a visual 
representation of my broad research framework. 
State policy, demography, and economy are the structural factors that bound 
the space for local government choices. These structural pressures and the capacity to 
push back shape the space for local government choices. As the sources of structural 
pressures and local capacity can change, the space for local choices will differ across 
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places and across time. Previous theories that emphasize structure (e.g. state rescaling) 
have focused on these factors separately, while previous theories that emphasize 
agency (e.g. progressive cities or cutback management) have assumed too much power 
for local governments or managers.  
 




 I explore the potential for local government agency in terms of alternative 
revenue sources, alternative service delivery, and narratives. As the structural forces of 
a recession linked to a housing market decline shrink the main tax base for local 
governments (i.e. property taxes) and increase service needs, local governments can 
search for alternative revenues in charges to substitute for the lost revenue. This 
corresponds to the strategic behaviors that regime theory (Stone 1989) and growth 
machine theory (Logan and Molotch 1987) predict. They can also use alternative 
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service delivery methods to decrease the cost of service delivery. This corresponds to 
the strategic behaviors that cutback management theories (Levine 1978) and austerity 
urbanism theories (Peck 2014) predict. And lastly, they can use narratives to push 
back against political pressures from higher levels of government. This corresponds to 
the potential for better communication between local governments and citizens that 
communicative planning theories envision in progressive cities (Clavel 2013; Sager 
2002). 
I advance a theory of pragmatic municipalism that explores this dynamic 
interaction between structural constraints and local agency. The first paper finds local 
governments use alternative revenue sources and alternative service delivery (e.g. 
privatization, cooperation) to maintain services under fiscal and economic stress. The 
second paper focuses on alternative revenue sources, charges and fees, and compares 
them to the use of property taxes – a revenue source that theories of fiscal federalism 
have recommended for local governments. I find that the reliance on property tax is 
higher in places with more capacity, and that the use of charges is limited by structural 
constraints, such as growth pressures and urbanity. The third paper explores how 
politics constrain local governments and the importance of narratives in pushing back 
against these constraints. 
In sum, the three papers in this dissertation show that while local governments 
do exercise agency, the structural forces largely overpower local agency. Structural 
constraints limit both the use of alternative service delivery and alternative revenue 
sources. Narratives, in particular, are actually used by state governments to further 
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Unit of Study: General-Purpose Local Governments 
My unit of study is general-purpose local governments (counties, cities, 
villages, towns) as they deliver a variety of services we use on a daily basis. However, 
there are differences among general-purpose local governments, and I acknowledge 
these differences in my studies. For example, counties play a direct role in 
redistribution through social services (see Figure 4), while municipalities deliver 
public safety services and various quality-of-life services related to environment and 
housing. The first and second papers restrict analyses to municipalities. The third 
paper includes counties and municipalities, and notes different political and fiscal 























Data source: 2012 Census of Governments 
Note: Expenditures are total general direct expenditures. Social services and income 
maintenance include public welfare, hospitals, health, employment security 
administration, and veterans’ services. Environment and housing includes natural 
resources, parks and recreation, housing and community development, sewerage, and 
solid waste management. Public safety includes police, fire, correction, and protective 
inspection and regulation. Transportation includes highways, airports, parking 
facilities, and sea and inland port facilities. Education services include elementary and 
secondary education, other, and libraries. Governmental administration includes 
financial administration, judicial and legal, general public buildings, and other 
governmental administration. Other includes miscellaneous commercial activities and 




I use a pragmatism framework for my methodology, as well as theory, and 
thus use mixed methods across the three papers. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) define 
pragmatism as “a deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such as ‘truth’ and 
‘reality’ and focuses instead on ‘what works’ as the truth regarding the research 
questions under investigation” (p. 713). The questions that the first and second paper 
address are about widespread local government behaviors and describing how various 
demographic, economic, and fiscal factors are related to local services and revenue 
structures. I use regression models with national data to answer these questions. The 
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third paper addresses the question of politics, which is often implicit and difficult to 
quantify. Political pressures are also inherently contextual. I use a case study that 
allows deep understandings of contemporary phenomena within a real-life context 
(Yin 2009). 
 
Overview: Three-Papers Format 
This dissertation project follows a three-paper format. The first paper is a 
national study on local government service provision and delivery. The second paper 
is a national study on local government finance (revenue structures). The third paper is 
a case study of New York State focusing on the politics of local governance. The first 
paper posits a theory of pragmatic municipalism to describe local government 
behaviors in a post-recession context – using innovations in service delivery and 
revenues to maintain services. The second paper explores two of the most important 
own-source revenues for local governments – property taxes and charges – and how 
state policy, demography, and economy shape dependence on these two revenue 
sources. The third paper uses a case study of New York State to examine how political 
narratives exert pressures on local governments, restraining their choices for raising 
revenues and adjusting expenditures. 
 
Conclusion 
Local governments have played a major role in American democracy as a 
space to learn about local needs (Dewey 1954; Dryzek 2000; Pateman 1970) and as 
agents who can respond to those needs (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972). However, local 
governments face a complex set of constraints from state policies, demography, and 
economy. The few municipal bankruptcies after the Great Recession highlighted these 
 56 
 
constraints and raised concerns about austerity responses at the local level. The three 
papers in this dissertation show local governments practice pragmatic municipalism 
and continue to exercise agency through service delivery and revenue innovations. 
However, this is a short term strategy that local governments have used to maintain 
their role as service providers. Given the power of structural constraints, this may not 
be a sustainable strategy in the long term. In a world of shifting state-local relations, 
this dissertation suggests the assumptions of more efficiency and transparency in a 
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PRAGMATIC MUNICIPALISM: LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY 
AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION 4 
Abstract 
Since the Great Recession, some argue local governments have become “austerity 
machines” that cut and privatize services and undermine unions. We conducted a 
national survey of US municipalities in 2012 to examine how service provision level 
and delivery methods are related to local stress and capacity, controlling for 
community need and place characteristics. We find local governments are balancing 
the pressures of stress with community needs. They use alternative revenue sources 
and service delivery methods (privatization and cooperation) to maintain services. 
Unionization is not a barrier to innovation. Further, we find ethnically diverse suburbs 
are providing more services than other suburbs, thus acting more like metro core 
cities. We find the Great Recession has not dramatically shifted local government 
behavior to a “new normal” of fiscal austerity. Instead, we find municipalities 
practicing “pragmatic municipalism” to maintain their public role. 
 
Introduction 
Local governments provide a wide range of services that people depend on 
daily and in times of need. Thus, local government choices about services have 
                                                 
4 An earlier version of this chapter has been published: Kim, Yunji and Warner, 
Mildred E. 2016. “Pragmatic Municipalism: Local Government Service Delivery After 
the Great Recession.” Public Administration 94(3): 789-805. The main difference is 
this chapter includes the results of logistic regressions and a discussion of effect sizes 
(see Appendix 2). 
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important implications for community quality of life. Detroit is an extreme case of 
how local government choices in the wake of economic shocks can harm its residents. 
Few local governments have declared bankruptcy, but there is reason to worry about 
how local governments are coping with the economic shocks of the Great Recession. 
Local governments have weak own-source revenue structures (heavy reliance on 
property taxes) and face expenditure pressures from growing service demands (Pagano 
and Johnston 2000; Joyce and Pattison 2010; Pollitt 2010). The American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) provided short-lived support to local governments 
(Johnson 2009), and some public finance scholars forecast a permanent, growing gap 
between revenues and expenditures (Ward and Dadayan 2009). Given these 
constraints, this paper studies how local governments are providing and delivering 
services after the Great Recession. 
Using case studies of distressed cities, political geographers have articulated a 
new theory of “austerity urbanism” (Peck 2012, 2014; Donald et al. 2014), arguing 
local governments are undermining public service delivery, citizen wellbeing, and 
social equity (Glasmeier and Lee-Chuvala 2011; Richardson 2011; Donald et al. 
2014). This theory sees little possibility of local governments pushing back against the 
pressures to cut or privatize services. In public administration, scholars have also 
argued that the Great Recession has pushed local governments to adopt a “new 
normal” of cutting services rather than raising revenues (Pandey 2010; Scorsone and 
Plerhoples 2010; Martin et al. 2012). 
Empirical work on US local government behavior after the Great Recession is 
still scant, and limited to studies with small samples (e.g. Skidmore and Scorsone 
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2011; Nelson 2012; Peck 2012; Donald et al. 2014) or time frames that may not fully 
capture the impacts of the Recession (e.g. Lobao and Adua 2011; Lobao et al. 2014). 
Given the time lag between public finance and market pressures, 2012 is a crucial 
moment to examine local government behavior. We conducted a national survey of 
US municipalities in 2012 to provide a comprehensive picture of service delivery in 
the aftermath of the Great Recession. We find local governments are practicing 
“pragmatic municipalism” (a term we use to describe local government behaviors that 
balance community needs and fiscal pressures), looking to diverse revenue sources 
and alternative delivery methods to maintain service provision. 
 
Public Services After the Great Recession 
Local Government Responses to Fiscal Stress 
The public management literature on local government responses to fiscal 
stress builds on Charles Levine’s (1978, 1979) work on cutback management and 
argues local governments make step-by-step cuts to manage fiscal stress (Levine 1978; 
Wolman 1983). However, Downs and Rocke (1984) found local governments are 
severely limited by mandatory or uncontrollable expenditures, arguing government 
managers try to cope with the “rising cost of operating a permanent bureaucracy and 
maintaining current service levels in the face of inflation and structural change (e.g. 
change in demographic or industrial base)” (p. 340). Pagano (1988) found local 
governments to be more resilient; able to adapt to their environment through cost-
shifting mechanisms (e.g. user fees; special assessments; sharing capital costs with 
developers and other governments). Meanwhile, Bartle (1996) and Pammer (1990) 
reported unstructured responses during retrenchment processes, supporting the 
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“garbage can model” (Cohen et al. 1972) that assumes organizational decisions are 
haphazard outcomes. 
In the 1980s, Wolman (1983) found service cuts are usually last resorts 
because they threaten the environmental stability of local governments, but Scorsone 
and Plerhoples (2010) identified a new era of cutback management that emerged in the 
early 2000s. In this new era, local governments relied more on budget cuts and 
restructuring, rather than tax increases. In a study from the 1990s, Pagano and 
Johnston (2000) projected service cuts in local governments due to structural problems 
of weak own-source revenues and poorly targeted intergovernmental aid. Martin et al. 
(2012) suggest service cuts will become part of the “new normal” for many local 
governments in post-2008 Recession times. They foresee local governments with 
fewer resources and smaller workforces having to make significant reforms in service 
delivery. 
Some scholars argue these changes signify a neoliberal transformation of local 
governments into austerity machines (Donald et al. 2014) or spaces of austerity 
urbanism (Peck 2012). The austerity machine refers to a coalition of business and 
financial interests, local government, and state and national government actors who 
use austerity measures – often bypassing democratic processes – to decrease the level 
of public services and public employment (Donald et al. 2014). They do so by directly 
cutting local government aid, limiting revenue-raising capacity, or reducing and 
privatizing services (Peck 2012). Some examples are Detroit’s unelected emergency 
administrators restructuring public employment terms and privatizing public assets, 
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and the activities of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the Tea 
Party to rewrite state legislation to limit local government power (see Peck 2014).  
In a comparative study of the US and Europe, Warner and Clifton (2014) 
found local governments are not simply shedding services (“hollowing out”; more 
common in Europe), but using market tools such as developer impact fees and 
Business Improvement Districts to “ride the wave” of marketization (more common in 
the US), meeting the demands of fiscal stress without service cuts. Nelson (2012) 
studied sixteen US municipalities from four regions in the US and found they followed 
a bounded rationality model; they adhere to a rational sequence of decisions in the 
early stages, but as the economic situation gets worse, their behaviors become less 
predictable and more divergent. Cepiku et al. (2016) studied six local governments in 
Italy, and found a variety of responses depending on political and managerial capacity 
and community relations. In contrast to austerity urbanism theory, which predicts 
increases in private sector power after the Recession, they did not find private sector 
empowerment in these localities. In fact, they found local managers renegotiated better 
contracts with private contractors and strengthened contractor monitoring. 
 
Pragmatic Management 
Local governments often turn to alternative service delivery as a means to 
address fiscal stress. In a study of Wisconsin cities and villages, Maher and Deller 
(2007) found contracting out was one of the most popular responses to fiscal stress. 
Bel and Fageda (2007) reviewed thirty empirical studies of local government 
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privatization5, and found fiscal stress associated with more privatization of services. 
For places under pressure to cut costs, contracting out can be a more pragmatic 
response than eliminating services. By pragmatic, we mean balancing service needs 
and fiscal needs with a focus on problem-solving. Service elimination risks resident 
complaints, making it a less pragmatic choice. 
Whether contracting out achieves cost savings is unclear. Empirical studies in 
the US and other countries have not found strong or consistent support for the claim 
that privatization leads to cost savings (Hodge 2000; Bel et al. 2010b). European 
studies of inter-municipal cooperation are more focused on cost savings than US 
studies (Bel and Warner 2015), and recent studies highlight the importance of context 
and contracting relations in the US (Bel and Warner 2016). For example, Zafra-
Gómez et al. (2013) found inter-municipal cooperation, not privatization, offers cost-
savings in waste management services among Spanish municipalities. A follow up 
study found alternative delivery methods decrease efficiency during the period before 
the Great Recession, but improved efficiency afterward (Pérez-López et al. 2015). In a 
review of studies in the US, Holzer and Fry (2011) found little evidence that 
cooperation leads to cost savings. 
Previous literature has found local governments are pragmatic and consider a 
wide range of issues for service delivery decisions (Warner and Hebdon 2001; Bel and 
Fageda 2007; Hebdon and Jalette 2008; Hefetz et al. 2012). Local government 
                                                 
5 Privatization can mean either service shedding or contracting with for-profit 
organizations. In the US context, the term has been used to refer to the latter (Savas 
1989). Following this convention, we use the term privatization to mean service 
delivery by contracting with for-profit organizations. 
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managers recognize differences in the strengths and weaknesses of various delivery 
methods and use them strategically. For example, Girth et al. (2012) found managers 
recognize competition is low in public service markets and often turn to inter-
municipal contracts instead of privatization. Managers choose mixed service delivery 
or inter-municipal cooperation over privatization for ease of monitoring, lower 
transaction costs (Rodrigues et al. 2012), and already existing trust between public 
organizations (Bel et al. 2013; Hefetz et al. 2014a). 
Privatization and cooperation have different drivers. While motivators of 
privatization decisions are largely cost concerns, motivators for inter-municipal 
cooperation are broader, including strengthening regional relations and regional 
integration (Warner 2011). The transaction costs literature predicts that contracting out 
decisions depend on service characteristics, such as asset specificity and service 
measurability (Levin and Tadelis 2010), as well as market competition, level of public 
interest in service delivery process, and place characteristics (Hefetz and Warner 
2012). Service type may also influence provision decisions. For example, public safety 
and public works are considered essential and many health and human services are 
mandated. During times of stress, non-essential services (e.g. parks and recreation, 
cultural programs) may be cut first (Bern and Stiefel 1993).  
Capacity, defined as fiscal and managerial resources that the organization has 
access to, matters for responses to fiscal stress. In a 2008 survey of 1,756 US counties, 
Lobao and Adua (2011) found those with greater capacity (larger, professionalized, 
and unionized) adopt austerity measures first. Pallesen (2004) found similar results in 
Denmark.  In a follow up study, Lobao et al. (2014) found local government capacity 
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and external pressures (i.e. from state and federal governments, and competition with 
other local governments), rather than class interests (e.g. businesses, unions) and 
political-ideological context, explain use of business attraction policies, privatization, 
and levels of social service provision. 
Unions have been a counterforce to austerity measures in Europe through 
public protests (Warner and Clifton 2014), and in Canada through internal opposition 
(Hebdon 2006) or suggesting alternatives to privatization (Jalette and Hebdon 2012). 
In the US, most large-scale quantitative studies find no effect of unionization on 
privatization (Warner and Hebdon 2001; Zullo 2009) or a counterintuitive effect of 
more service cuts (Lobao and Adua 2011) or more privatization (Lobao et al. 2014). 
However, Davis (2010) found unionization increases public service motivation – “an 
individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded uniquely in public service 
institutions and organizations” (Perry and Wise 1990, p. 368) – and Lobao et al. 
(2014) found social services are more likely to be preserved in places with more 
public sector unionization. We expect unionization will not have an effect on level of 
privatization or inter-municipal cooperation if these are pragmatic decisions made by 
public managers. 
 Fiscal stress has led to the search for alternative revenue sources. Developer 
impact fees, user fees, sales taxes, hotel taxes, and tax increment financing have 
become popular, especially in fast growing markets (Weber 2010; Kim and Warner 
2015). Some scholars see use of these financial tools as acquiescence to a neoliberal 
ethos that increases fiscal burdens to the household and restricts access to services 
based on ability to pay (Peck 2012, 2014). On the other hand, diversifying revenues 
 81 
 
reduces tax effort (defined as tax revenue divided by total personal income; Hendrick 
2002), helps localities get around tax constraints (Mullins and Joyce 1996), and allows 
municipalities to avoid reducing services (Warner and Clifton 2014). Whether these 
alternative revenue sources help local governments provide services is important given 
the pressures on local government finance after the Great Recession. 
 
Need and Place Characteristics 
Local governments operate within the boundaries of community need and 
place characteristics. While austerity urbanism scholars view municipalities as failing 
to respond to community needs, pragmatic municipalism views municipal managers as 
attempting to balance the two. For example, contracting out is not uniform across local 
governments by size, metropolitan location, or wealth (Joassart-Marcelli and Musso 
2005; Hefetz et al. 2012). Larger places tend to use more privatization, while smaller 
places use more cooperation to achieve cost savings (Maher and Deller 2007; Plata-
Díaz et al. 2014; Zafra-Gómez et al. 2014). This may be a pragmatic choice for small 
places that lack a competitive market of service providers (Warner and Hefetz 2003; 
Maher and Deller 2007; Mohr et al. 2010; Hefetz et al. 2012). Cooperation is an 
increasingly popular reform because it can promote cost savings while keeping the 
service public (Holzer and Fry 2011). Recent empirical work has found it to be the 
preferred alternative when services are complex or community heterogeneity is high 
(Girth et al. 2012; Hefetz and Warner 2012). 
Private service providers are largely driven by profit and scholars have found 
lower competition among private providers for social welfare services because these 
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services tend to be less profitable (Johnston and Girth 2012). Scholars also have found 
less privatization in places with higher poverty and lower income, as these areas are 
less attractive to private firms (Warner and Hefetz 2003; Mohr et al. 2010; Hefetz et 
al. 2012). Demographic heterogeneity can have a similar impact as need. High levels 
of heterogeneity increase the complexity of service delivery and raise transaction costs 
(Nelson 1997; Hefetz and Warner 2012). 
Suburbs in the US have been more attractive in the privatization market 
(Warner and Hefetz 2002; Joassart-Marceli and Musso 2005; Hebdon and Jalette 
2008; Hefetz et al. 2012) due to their small size, higher income, and lower poverty. 
Metro core communities have higher poverty rates and provide more services than 
suburban localities. However, an important shift is now occurring with nonwhite and 
poor populations growing faster in suburbs than in metro core cities between 2000 and 
2010 (Frey 2015). As suburbs become more diverse, they face similar challenges as 
metro core6 communities, but lack the broad service array and institutional structure to 
meet them. Using 2000 US County Business Patterns and 2000 US Census Data, 
Murphy and Wallace (2010) found that suburban poor neighborhoods have fewer 
social service organizations, especially mobility enhancing organizations that provide 
education and employment services. 
Both rural and metro core local governments have historically faced greater 
levels of mismatch between service needs and revenues. Metro core and rural 
governments deliver more services directly via public employees, but both increased 
                                                 




their use of market delivery between 1992 and 2007 (Hefetz et al. 2012). However, 
they still exhibit higher direct public service delivery than suburbs. Rural areas have 
used cooperation as an alternative when they are unable to find competitive private 
contractors (Warner 2006; Mohr et al. 2010). 
Regional differences in the US show the Northeast and Midwest have a more 
fragmented local government structure, a history of strong unionization, and a more 
pro-government ideology (Warner 2013). The West and South typically have less 
fragmentation and larger governments, and much of the population growth has been in 
these regions (Kim and Warner 2015). Fragmentation may create more potential for 
inter-municipal cooperation (Holzer and Fry 2011), and privatization is easier to 
implement in new and growing services (Hefetz and Warner 2004).  These can lead to 
regional differences in service delivery. 
Building on previous literature on drivers of local government service delivery, 
we test a theory of pragmatic municipalism whereby local governments use alternative 
service delivery and revenue diversification to maintain services in the aftermath of 
the Great Recession. We posit this pragmatic perspective (Boin et al. 2005; Hefetz et 
al. 2014b; Farjoun et al. 2015) as an alternative to the austerity urbanism perspective 








Table 2. Comparison of Austerity Urbanism and Pragmatic Municipalism 
Austerity Urbanism Pragmatic Municipalism 
Local government responses are 
political. 
Local government manages political 
interests – balancing need, unions, and 
service responsibilities. 
 
Local governments ignore community 
needs. 
 
Local governments respond to 
community needs within constraints. 
 
Local governments pursue more 
privatization. 
 
Local governments pursue both 
privatization and cooperation. 
 
Local governments pursue more user 
fees. 
 
Local governments pursue both user fees 
and a wider range of alternative revenue 
sources. 
Management is anti-union. 
 
Local governments manage unions and 
explore the possibility of collaborative 
management. 
 
Data and Model 
 We model service delivery in relation to levels of stress (defined as decline in 
local economy and low levels of organizational resources), government capacity, 
community needs, and place characteristics. Our dataset of 1,580 municipalities comes 
from a national survey of local government service delivery we conducted with the 
International City/County Management Association in 2012. Our sample frame 
includes all municipalities with population over 2,500. Our response rate was 23 
percent and evenly balanced across all population size categories and across 
geographic regions (see Homsy and Warner 2014 for full survey details). Most 
municipalities in the US are small to mid-sized. One strength of our study is its ability 
to capture the full range of municipality sizes in the US (rural municipalities are 
somewhat underrepresented, chi square = 172 df =2, 24% in sample, 37% in universe). 
We merged our survey data with the 2005-2009 and 2008-2012 rolling averages from 
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the American Community Survey (ACS), the 2010 US Census, and the 2007 Census 
of Governments (COG). 2012 is a meaningful time to study local governments, as 
public finance scholars have shown there is a lag between shocks in the market and 
their impact on public finance that typically ranges from 18 months to several years 
(Pagano et al. 2012). 
 Our survey asks US local government managers whether they currently deliver 
specific public services, how they deliver these services, and other factors related to 
service delivery (e.g. unionization rates, other revenue sources, etc.). The survey 
covers 76 services, including public safety, public works, utilities, human services 
(especially for children, elderly, and the poor), recreation and culture, and 
administrative support services. For each of the 76 services, respondents (i.e. the local 
government manager or chief administrative officer) can check whether they currently 
provide the service, no longer provide it, or have never provided it. For services 
currently provided by the government, respondents are asked to choose all relevant 
delivery methods: public employees entirely (“direct public”), public employees in 
part; contract with private for profit (“privatization”), another government or authority 
(“cooperation”), private nonprofit, franchise/concessions, subsidies, and volunteers.  
Our dependent variables are ratios that measure the level of service provision 
and the three most commonly used delivery methods—direct public, privatization, and 
cooperation—that account for 88 percent of provision in 2012. Provision is a 
proportion of services provided out of total possible 76 services on the survey and 
delivery method variables are proportions of services delivered via each method out of 
the total number of services provided. We find that direct public is the most common 
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delivery method accounting for 49 percent of service provision on average, followed 
by cooperation (22%) and privatization (17%). A breakdown by place characteristics 
shows that metro core municipalities have the highest level of provision (42 services), 
followed by suburbs (36 services) and rural municipalities (35 services). Direct public 
delivery is most common in rural municipalities (55% of total services delivered), 
while cooperation (23%) and privatization (18%) are more common in suburbs (see 
Table 3). Our independent and control variables are described below. 
Stress: Local governments under severe stress may shed services (Pagano and 
Johnston 2000; Martin et al. 2012). We use the number of services a local government 
no longer provides (2012 survey) as a measure of cutbacks in our service delivery 
method models. We do not include this in the provision model as this would be a 
tautology: the more services shed, the fewer services provided. Based on previous 
works (Lobao and Adua 2011; Wolman 1983) and our theory of pragmatic 
municipalism that local governments try to maintain services, we do not expect service 
elimination to be widespread. The descriptive statistics support this; on average, about 
two services are no longer provided (see Table 3). 
The unemployment rate is used to capture both the stress local governments 
may face from a population with lower ability to pay taxes, and the demand for more 
services that help the unemployed. Unemployment is highest in metro core areas 
(10%), followed by rural areas (9.2%). 
Declining property values may contribute to local government fiscal stress. 
We calculate the percentage decrease in home value for each municipality using 
rolling averages from the ACS. The absolute difference between median home value 
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in 2008-2012 and 2005-2009 is divided by the median home value in 2005-2009 (all 
adjusted for inflation), and then multiplied by 100. Places where median home value 
increased or remained the same have a value of zero for this variable. Home value 
decrease was most severe in the metro core (11.2%) and suburbs (11.8%). We also 
include prior levels of local government debt per capita (2007 COG), which were 
largest in the metro core. 
Capacity: We measure both fiscal and managerial sources of capacity. For 
fiscal capacity, we use state intergovernmental aid to localities per capita (2007 COG) 
because state aid can lower revenue burdens on cities by acting as a substitute for 
own-source revenues (Pagano and Johnston 2000; Xu and Warner 2016). Some states 
specifically target their aid to places with higher needs, and in aggregate, state aid per 
capita to metro core cities (which have higher poverty rates) is greater than state aid 
per capita to suburbs (see Table 3). However, there is no clear pattern or consistency 
in state aid distribution (Fisher and Bristle 2012), and given same poverty rates, a city 
that receives higher state aid has that much more resources to use than a city that 
receives less state aid. We also include local government expenditure per capita (2007 
COG) and median home value (2008-2012 ACS) as a proxy for property tax base 
(which is not available on a comparative basis at the national level). Local government 
expenditure per capita and state aid per capita are highest in metro core municipalities. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics, US Municipalities 
 
Metro core Suburb Rural Total 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Services provided (#; total possible= 76) a 41.8 15.2 36.0 13.7 34.8 13.8 36.4 14.1 
Services delivered via direct public (#) a 22.1 13.2 16.7 11.0 19.1 11.8 17.9 11.6 
Services delivered via privatization (#) a 6.2 5.8 6.6 5.6 4.7 5.0 6.1 5.5 
Services delivered via cooperation (#) a 8.0 8.5 8.3 9.1 6.8 8.7 7.9 8.9 
Services no longer provided (#; “shedding”) a 2.7 4.0 1.8 3.5 2.8 4.7 2.2 3.9 
Unemployment (%) b 10.0 3.3 8.4 3.9 9.2 4.8 8.7 4.1 
Median home value decrease (%) b, c 11.2 11.8 11.8 12.3 5.2 7.6 10.2 11.6 
Local government debt per capita, 2007 US 
$1000d 
2.7 6.4 1.4 1.9 1.5 2.3 1.6 2.9 
State aid per capita, 2007 US $1000 d .3 .4 .2 .3 .2 .3 .2 .3 
Local government expenditure per capita, 
2007 US$1000 d 
1.7 .9 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 
Median home value, 2012 US $1000b 217.4 148.6 246.9 174.2 134.5 95.8 217.1 163.0 
User fees (dummy; 1=yes) a .8 .4 .7 .5 .6 .5 .7 .5 
Other revenue sources (aggregate index; total 
possible = 12) a 
4.0 2.4 2.6 2.0 2.1 1.8 2.6 2.1 
Council manager a .8 .4 .6 .5 .6 .5 .6 .5 
Unionization (categorical) a 3.1 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.3 
Poverty (%) b 18.5 8.3 11.1 8.0 19.0 9.0 13.8 9.1 
Population under age 18 (%) b 22.6 4.4 24.4 5.3 23.5 4.9 24.0 5.2 
Population over age 75 (%) b 6.5 2.9 6.9 3.7 8.3 3.2 7.2 3.5 
Ln(population) e 11.3 .98 9.4 1.0 8.8 .68 9.6 1.3 
Nonwhite population (%) b 27.7 14.9 16.5 15.5 15.4 17.0 17.1 16.0 
Sample size (valid N) 178 1,029 373 1,580 
Data source: a 2012 ICMA Alternative Service Delivery Survey; b 2008-2012 American Community Survey; c 2005-2009 
American Community Survey; d 2007 US Census of Governments; e 2010 US Census. 
Note: The unionization is measured as: 0=none, 1=less than 10%, 2 = 10% -29%, 4=30%-40%, 5=50% or more. 
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Our survey explored the extent to which local governments are using new 
revenue sources to meet their fiscal demands. Previously, this was not possible to test 
as there were no data on local government use of alternative revenue sources. Our 
survey collected this information for the first time and we test whether use of a 
broader array of alternative revenue sources is associated with more service provision 
as our theory of pragmatic municipalism suggests. 
We asked which of thirteen mechanisms the local government uses to finance 
service delivery and found the following responses: 72% report charging user fees, 
48% use development review fees, 40% have hotel occupancy taxes, 35% use tax 
increment financing, 35% charge local impact fees or developer exactions, 19% have 
taxes dedicated to specific services, 14% have Business Improvement Districts, 14% 
sell government assets, 11% collect mortgage or property transfer fees, 8% have 
public private partnership (P3) financing for infrastructure, 8% have private home 
owner associations, and 5% have tax base sharing. Respondents were asked to check 
all mechanisms they use. User fees are the most popular alternative revenue source 
that directly inhibits access to services. Thus, we include a dummy variable for user 
fees, separate from the other alternative revenue sources. The remaining alternative 
revenue sources were aggregated into an “other revenue sources” index (total possible 
= 12). User fees and other alternative revenue sources are most common in the metro 
core, followed by suburbs. 
For organizational capacity, we use a dummy variable that indicates whether 
the local government has a council-manager form. Previous studies find council-
manager forms linked with more innovation in service delivery as these are 
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professional managers who have more capacity to contract out and monitor these 
contracts (Lobao and Adua 2011; Nelson and Svara 2011; Lobao et al. 2014; Hefetz et 
al. 2014b; Carr 2015). Based on these studies, we expect council-manager forms to be 
associated with higher use of alternative delivery methods.  
Previous studies on unionization have relied on case studies (Hebdon 2006), 
state laws regarding collective bargaining (Zullo 2009), or limited their analysis to 
counties (Lobao et al. 2014). Our study collected information from municipalities on 
actual levels of public sector unionization, similar to the procedure used by Jalette and 
Hebdon (2012) among Canadian municipalities. We asked whether employees are 
covered by collective bargaining agreements and if so, what proportion are covered. 
Categorical answers for the proportion of unionization range from none, less than 
10%, 10% - 29%, 30% - 49%, to 50% or more. Of the 1,580 municipalities in our 
sample, 52% have a unionization rate of 50% or more, 31% do not have any 
unionization, and 17% have unionization rates between 10% and 50%. Based on the 
mixed results from previous studies, we do not expect unionization to have a 
significant effect on service delivery if pragmatic municipalism is being practiced. 
Need: We control for need by poverty rate, percent of population less than 18 
years old, and percent of population older than 75 (all 2008-2012 ACS). Children and 
elderly make greater demands on local government services (Edwards 2010), and thus 
communities with a higher percentage of dependent population will be under pressure 
to maintain service levels (Warner et al. 2016). Despite recent changes in suburban 
demographics (Frey 2015), poverty levels are still higher in metro core and rural areas 
than suburbs. If cities are pursuing austerity urbanism, they will provide fewer 
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services despite higher need. In contrast, if cities are following pragmatic 
municipalism, we expect need to be associated with more service provision. 
 Place Characteristics: We control for population (2010 US Census), nonwhite 
population (2008-2012 ACS), and metro status. We coded principal cities within 
metropolitan statistical areas as metro core, and the remainder of metropolitan 
statistical areas as suburban, using the 2010 US Census place definitions according to 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 2000 standards (No. 08-01 Bulletin) 
and 2010 standards (No. 13-01 Bulletin). By distinguishing principal cities, we have 
built a more comprehensive measure of suburbs than OMB’s measure of outlying 
counties, which leaves many suburbs in the metro core category. All other places are 
coded as rural. We expect metro core governments to provide more services, and 
suburbs to provide fewer services and use higher levels of privatization. We control 
for racially diverse suburbs with an interaction term of percent nonwhite population 
times suburb dummy and expect them to behave more like metro core cities than 
traditional suburbs. We also include regional controls, and expect higher provision 
levels, public delivery, and cooperation in the Northeast and Midwest, and higher 
privatization levels in the West and South. 
 We run four models; one on level of service provision, and three on delivery 
methods (direct public delivery, privatization, and inter-municipal cooperation). Our 
unit of analysis is the local government and we examine information on service 
delivery behavior as an aggregate of all 76 services. The dependent variables are the 
proportion of total services provided or delivered by each alternative out of the total 
possible number of services, and range from 0 to 1. We can see our dependent 
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variables as binary responses (to provide or not to provide; to use select delivery 
method or not), and thus use probit regressions. 
 
Results: Local Government Service Provision And Delivery 
 Table 4 shows the results for all models (i.e. provision, direct public, 
privatization, cooperation).7 Our core variables of interest regarding local stress show 
that local governments with greater decrease in home values and more prior debt have 
lower levels of service provision. This suggests some hollowing out as a result of 
fiscal stress. In terms of delivery methods, places with higher unemployment, greater 
home value decrease, and greater prior debt have lower rates of public delivery, but 
more privatization and cooperation. This suggests a pragmatic municipal response of 
using alternative service delivery to maintain services. 
These findings are consistent with previous studies that found a link between 
fiscal stress and privatization (Bel and Fageda 2007) and cooperation (Joassart-
Marcelli and Musso 2005). Local governments are using both privatization and 
cooperation to cope with stress. Meanwhile, places that are shedding more services 
use more public delivery and less privatization or cooperation. These places are less 
able or willing to innovate by contracting out. Thus, our models show evidence of 
governments responding to local stress by using alternative delivery methods as a 
means to maintain service delivery. 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 2 for Logistic regression results and a discussion of effect sizes. 
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Table 4. Probit Regression Results: Service Delivery across US Municipalities, 2012 
 Provision Direct public Privatization Cooperation 
Stress     
Shedding  0.021*** -0.008*** -0.028*** 
Unemployment (%) -0.002 -0.009*** 0.008*** 0.006** 
Home value decrease (%) -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
Local government debt per capita 
(2007 US $1000) -0.005** -0.014*** 0.012*** 0.006* 
Capacity     
State aid per capita (2007 
US$1000) 0.059*** -0.044* 0.029 0.006 
Local government expenditure per 
capita (2007 US$1000) 0.048*** 0.047*** -0.035*** -0.055*** 
Median home value (2012 US 
$1000) -0.158E-6*** -0.363E-6*** 0.313E-6*** 0.098E-6* 
User fees 0.128*** 0.019 -0.019 0.031 
Other revenue sources 0.036*** -0.038*** 0.032*** 0.024*** 
Council manager -0.020* -0.000 0.073*** -0.027* 
Unionization 0.009*** -0.003 0.005 -0.009** 
Need     
Poverty (%) -0.001 0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
Population under age 18 (%) -0.000 0.004** 0.002 -0.005*** 
Population over age 75 (%) 0.004*** -0.004* -0.003 0.005** 
Place characteristics     
Ln (population) 0.064*** 0.071*** -0.012 -0.100*** 
Nonwhite population (%) -0.001** -0.004*** 0.002* 0.004*** 
Suburb -0.037 -0.118*** 0.191*** 0.036 
Suburb*nonwhite 0.003*** 0.002** -0.003** -0.001 
Rural -0.005 0.052* 0.062* -0.080** 
South & West 0.049*** -0.028* -0.081*** 0.189*** 
Intercept -0.868*** -0.530*** -1.180*** 0.141 
Pearson goodness of fit statistics 
χ2 (1560) = 
14,466 
p = 0.000 
χ2 (1559) = 
16,143 
p = 0.000 
χ2 (1559) = 
7,350 
p = 0.000 
χ2 (1559) = 
14,821 
p = 0.000 
Source: Authors' analysis of 2012 ICMA Alternative Service Delivery Survey; 2007 
Census of Governments; 2005-2009, 2008-2012 American Community Survey. 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 Values reported are coefficients of probit model. N 




Regarding capacity, we find places with greater median home value provide 
fewer services, use less public delivery, and use more privatization and cooperation. 
This suggests alternative delivery methods may be easier to implement in places with 
greater fiscal capacity. These results support our theory of pragmatic municipalism 
that localities use a variety of alternative revenue sources to maintain service delivery. 
Although user fees and privatization have been criticized as evidence of neoliberal 
restructuring (Peck 2012), we find user fees are not linked to more privatization. By 
contrast, use of other revenue sources is associated with less public delivery and more 
privatization and cooperation. Some of these revenue sources transfer service 
provision responsibility to the private actor and can reduce service delivery pressures 
on the local government. 
Our results show unionization rates are positively associated with provision 
levels. This suggests the possibility of collaborative management with unions. 
However, unionization is linked to less cooperation and this may reflect difficulty in 
structuring sharing agreements between municipalities with different union contracts. 
Unionization does not have a significant effect on level of public delivery or 
privatization. Local government decisions seem to be pragmatic, rather than driven by 
union pressure. 
Local government responses differ by type of need. Local governments with 
larger elderly population have higher provision levels, suggesting partial support for 
pragmatic municipalism. However, the size of the child population and poverty rates 
are not associated with a difference in provision levels. Places with larger elderly 
population use less direct public delivery and more cooperation. Services for the 
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elderly are typically provided via cooperation by regional area offices on aging 
(Warner et al. 2016). These findings imply limits of privatization and cooperation as 
methods to address high levels of need. Both alternatives require a willing partner 
(for-profit contractor or neighboring municipality), and high levels of need in the form 
of poverty and children (who lack voting power) can be unattractive to potential 
partners.  
We examined how place characteristics affect service delivery. Larger 
municipalities show higher levels of provision, more direct public delivery, and lower 
cooperation levels. This is consistent with prior literature that finds larger places use 
more direct public delivery (Hefetz et al. 2012) and have more complex service 
portfolios (Hebdon and Jalette 2008; Zullo 2009; Bel and Warner 2016). 
Places with larger minority population deliver fewer services and use less 
public delivery and more privatization and cooperation. Suburbs, compared to metro 
core areas, are associated with less direct public delivery and more privatization, as 
expected. Our measure of ethnically diverse suburbs (the suburb and nonwhite 
population interaction term) shows diverse suburbs provide more services, use more 
direct public delivery, and less privatization. These ethnically diverse suburbs behave 
differently from other suburbs and act more like metro core cities. Rural places show 
more direct public delivery, more privatization, and less cooperation, compared to 
metro core areas.  
The South and West have higher provision and cooperation and lower direct 
public delivery and privatization rates, compared to the Northeast and Midwest. We 
had expected the opposite due to more fragmentation and higher unionization in the 
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Northeast and Midwest.  However, these results mirror those found by Hebdon and 
Jallete (2008) in Canada where more conservative provinces (e.g. Alberta) showed 
less privatization. The South and West also have larger municipalities (in population) 
and more poverty (Kim and Warner 2015), and prior research has found privatization 
is lower in such higher cost markets (Hefetz et al. 2012).  
We also ran separate models for non-essential services (parks and recreation, 
cultural and arts programs). Our broader results regarding pragmatic municipalism 
remain unchanged, but we found this set of nine non-essential services are less 
responsive to stress, capacity, or need.  Citizens often prefer these services, making it 
difficult for managers to cut them in times of stress.  Among service delivery 
alternatives, only privatization is higher when stress is higher – suggesting these 
services may be more likely to be privatized when communities face stress (see 
Appendix 1). 
 
Discussion: Pragmatic Municipalism as Response to Local Stress 
Local governments are using a variety of delivery methods to respond to stress 
in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Our results show austerity urbanism, which 
predicts service cuts, privatization, and increased user fees, is too narrow to describe 
local government behavior. Instead, we find support for our theory of pragmatic 
municipalism, which emphasizes the role of public managers. Local governments are 
doing much more than simply hollowing out - cutting services or privatizing. 
Municipalities under more stress use both more privatization and more cooperation. 
Scholars have identified inter-municipal cooperation as a viable alternative to 
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privatization in places that lack competitive markets (Bel et al. 2010a; Mohr et al. 
2010; Hefetz and Warner 2012) and for services where regional coordination is 
required (Holzer and Fry 2011; Bel and Warner 2015). Our results suggest local 
governments are well aware of the variety of options they have, and are using both 
strategies. 
We find local governments’ use of alternative revenue sources is linked to 
maintaining services. While some argue these alternative revenue sources are evidence 
of the erosion of public values (Peck 2012), our results show their use is linked to 
higher service provision levels. User fees, in particular, are not linked to more 
privatization. However, broader use of alternative finances is linked to innovation in 
service delivery. We cannot assess the regressivity of these alternative revenue sources 
or their effects on service quality with our data. Given that revenue diversification has 
been an increasing trend (Hendrick 2002) and fees are an attractive tool for local 
governments in the “new normal” (Martin et al. 2012), this is an area that needs more 
study. 
Unions have been targets of austerity (Peck 2012), and austerity urbanism sees 
management as anti-union. However, we find unionization linked to higher provision 
levels, which signals the possibility of collaborative management. Unionization does 
not have a significant effect on rates of public delivery or privatization, supporting our 
theory that pragmatic municipalism is a managerial project, not a political one. 
Scholars in the past found local government responses to be unstructured 
(Pammer 1990; Bartle 1996). We argue local governments are strategic and use a 
variety of delivery methods and revenue sources that fit their context. In places with 
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high need, such as more poverty and larger child population, public delivery is more 
common. This implies local governments are aware of the limits to privatization and 
cooperation in higher need communities. Direct public delivery and cooperation are 
the only delivery methods that show higher rates in places with greater need. By 
contrast, affluent places with higher median home values provide fewer services, use 
less public delivery, and more privatization and cooperation.  
Geographic context matters. Previous studies have found suburbs are 
associated with less provision, less direct public delivery, and more privatization 
(Hebdon and Jalette 2008; Hefetz et al. 2012). Our results support these findings. 
However, we also find suburbs are no longer homogeneous. Suburbs with greater 
nonwhite population provide more services, use more direct public delivery, and less 
privatization. Our results suggest ethnically diverse suburbs are recognizing the needs 
of a diverse population and responding to them with strategies that differ from 
traditional suburbs. Lower privatization in diverse suburbs is particularly surprising 
given that suburbs have traditionally been considered preferred markets for 
privatization. However, as these diverse suburbs assume the characteristics of small 
cities, they begin to face similar demographic and fiscal challenges to metro core cities 
and pursue similar delivery strategies.  
 
Conclusion 
While fiscal stress since the Great Recession may have created a “new normal” 
for local governments (Martin et al. 2012), we do not find support for austerity 
urbanism as argued by some political geographers (Peck 2012, 2014; Donald et al. 
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2014). The austerity argument is based primarily on case studies, such as Detroit, 
which are not typical of most US cities. Our study looked at a national sample of US 
municipalities in 2012 and we find local government responses are both nuanced and 
pragmatic. Public administration scholars recognize local governments are more 
diverse and pragmatic in their response (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010; Nelson 2012; 
Warner and Clifton 2014; Farjoun et al. 2015; Cepiku et al. 2016), and our work 
confirms this view. 
We find US local governments are using service delivery alternatives and 
alternative revenue sources to maintain service delivery during times of stress. While 
our results show cities are not simply following a neoliberal austerity agenda, neither 
do we find them to be progressive centers, as service provision is lower in places with 
greater stress. Instead, what we see is a pragmatic municipalism that seeks to maintain 
service delivery and innovate within the confines of fiscal pressures. Whether these 
pragmatic approaches are robust to deepening local stress, only time will tell.
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APPENDIX 1. Probit Regression Results for Parks and Recreation Services and 
Cultural and Arts Programs 
 
 Provision Direct public Privatization Cooperation 
Stress     
Shedding  .021*** .003 -.020*** 
Unemployment (%) -.015*** -.004 .023** .007 
Home value decrease (%) .000 .001 .006** .001 
Local government debt per 
capita (2007 US$1000) 
.001 -.020** -.000 .013* 
Capacity     
State aid per capita (2007 
US$1000) 
-.030 -.024 -.065 -.051 
Local government expenditure 
per capita (2007 US$1000) 
.087*** .035 .022 -.073** 
Median home value (2012 
US$1000) 
-.048E-6 -.541E-6*** .577E-6*** -.115E-6 
User fees .188*** .116** .045 -.053 
Other revenue sources .030*** -.043*** .040** .040*** 
Council manager -.105*** .036 .148** -.004 
Unionization -.010 .006 -.028* -.001 
Need     
Poverty (%) .002 -.004 -.010* -.001 
Population under age 18 (%) -.002 -.003 -.001 -.007 
Population over age 75 (%) .008* -.005 -.006 .001 
Place characteristics     
Ln (population) .197*** .062** .119*** -.115*** 
Nonwhite population (%) -.000 -.004* -.002 .010*** 
Suburb .035 -.016 .336** .225* 
Suburb*nonwhite .003* .004* -.004 -.006** 
Rural .131* .043 .206 .083 
South & West .185*** .017 .007 .039  
Intercept -2.011*** -.451 -3.289*** -.13 
Pearson goodness of fit statistics 
χ2 (1560) = 
3,603 
p = .000 
χ2 (1481) = 
4,608 
p = .000 
χ2 (1480) = 
2,525 
p = .000 
χ2 (1480) = 
3,675 
p = .000 
Source: Authors' analysis of 2012 ICMA Alternative Service Delivery Survey; 2007 Census 
of Governments 2007; 2005-2009, 2008-2012 American Community Survey. 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 Values reported are coefficients of probit model. N = 1,580 
municipalities for provision model. 78 places, which do not provide any parks and recreation 




APPENDIX 2. Logistic Regression Results and Effect Size Interpretations (odds 
ratios) 
 Provision Direct public Privatization Cooperation 
Stress     
Shedding  1.036*** .986*** .947*** 
Unemployment (%) .996 .985*** 1.015*** 1.010** 
Home value decrease (%) .997*** .996*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 
Local government debt per 
capita (2007 US $1000) 
.992** .978*** 1.021*** 1.010* 
Capacity     
State aid per capita (2007 
US$1000) 
1.099*** .931* 1.053 1.008 
Local government expenditure 
per capita (2007 US$1000) 
1.080*** 1.079*** .940*** .908*** 
Median home value (2012 US 
$1000) 
1.000*** 1.000***  1.000*** 1.000* 
User fees 1.228*** 1.031 .968 1.060* 
Other revenue sources 1.060*** .942*** 1.059*** 1.040*** 
Council manager 0.969* 1.000 1.142*** .954* 
Unionization 1.015*** .995 1.009 .985** 
Need     
Poverty (%) .999 1.010*** .991*** .991*** 
Population under age 18 (%) .999 1.007** 1.003 .991*** 
Population over age 75 (%) 1.007*** .993* .995 1.009** 
Place characteristics     
Ln (population) 1.107*** 1.121*** .980 .843*** 
Nonwhite population (%) .998** .994*** 1.003* 1.007*** 
Suburb .942 .826*** 1.420*** 1.078 
Suburb*nonwhite 1.004*** 1.004** .995** .998 
Rural .991 1.085* 1.123* .880** 
South & West 1.082*** .955* .868*** 1.398*** 
Intercept .249*** .427*** .136*** 1.331 
Pearson goodness of fit statistics 
χ2 (1560) = 
14,467 
p = .000 
χ2 (1559) = 
16,143 
p = .000 
χ2 (1559) = 
7,349 
p = .000 
χ2 (1559) = 
14,812 
p = .000 
 
Source: Authors' analysis of 2012 ICMA Alternative Service Delivery Survey; 2007 
Census of Governments; 2005-2009, 2008-2012 American Community Survey. 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 Values reported are odds ratios from logistic 




For ease of interpretation, I use the results of logistic regressions to discuss the 
effect sizes of key variables. In general, the variables with the largest effect sizes 
across all models are the capacity and place variables. In terms of provision, user fees 
have the largest effect. The use of user fees increases the odds of providing a service 
by 23%. Place characteristics are the main drivers of delivery methods. Public delivery 
is largely driven by population. A 1% increase in population is associated with a 12% 
increase in the odds of a municipality using public delivery. The odds of privatizing a 
service is 42% higher in a suburban municipality, compared to an urban municipality, 
while the odds of delivering a service via cooperation is 40% higher in a municipality 
in the South or West regions, compared to those in the Northeast or Midwest. This is 
consistent with prior literature that finds larger places use more direct public delivery 
(Hefetz et al. 2012) and that suburbs are more likely to use privatization (Warner and 
Hefetz 2002; Joassart-Marceli and Musso 2005; Hebdon and Jalette 2008; Hefetz et al. 
2012). 
The core variables of interest regarding local stress have small effect sizes. For 
example, a $1000 increase in prior debt per capita lowers the odds of providing a 
service by 0.8%. Holding all variables at the average value, an urban municipality in 
the Northeast or Midwest with a council-manager has a 50% chance of providing any 
service. A similar municipality with $10,000 more debt per capita has a 48% chance 
of providing any service. This is in line with our expectations that service cuts would 
be unlikely. In terms of delivery methods, service shedding has the largest effect size 
among the stress variables. For every additional service no longer provided, the odds 
of delivering a service via public delivery increase by 3.6% and the odds of delivering 
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a service via privatization and cooperation decrease by 1.4% and 5.3%, respectively. 
So for places shedding services, use of alternative service delivery is less likely. Need 
variables also have small effect sizes. A 1 percentage point increase in poverty is 
associated with a 0.9% decrease in the odds of delivering a service via cooperation and 
a 0.9% decrease in the odds of delivering a service via privatization. Likewise, places 
facing more need are less likely to pursue alternative service delivery. 
As mentioned, service shedding is rare so these effects will only have 
noticeable impacts in the extreme cases. For example, an urban municipality in the 
Northeast or Midwest that charges user fees, has a council-manager, and average 
values for all other variables has a 56% chance of using public delivery, 13% chance 
of using privatization, and 18% chance of using cooperation to deliver any service. 
Descriptive statistics show, on average, municipalities deliver approximately 50% of 
services via public delivery, 17% via privatization, and 22% of services via 
cooperation (out of 36 services provided; see Table 3). Using Flint, MI as an extreme 
case with a 40% poverty rate that reported 10 services are no longer provided, the 
predicted probabilities of delivering a service via public delivery, privatization, and 
cooperation are 64%, 13%, and 8.6%, respectively. These predicted values are higher 
than those actually reported by Flint, MI in the survey. Flint, MI reported delivering 
55% of its services via public delivery, 9% via privatization, and 9% via cooperation 
(out of 22 services provided) – even lower rates of alternative service delivery than 
predicted by the model. Overall, stressed municipalities are less likely to use 
alternative service delivery, and places with severe stress like Flint, MI have much 
lower chances of using these methods.  
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Although the effect sizes of stress and need variables are small, the findings 
have important implications for the strength of pragmatic municipalism as a response 
to fiscal stress. The vast majority of places are maintaining the number of services 
they provide with alternative delivery methods, but municipalities with extreme 
poverty or stress are less likely to use these alternative delivery mechanisms. This 
study focused on identifying general responses across local governments, but future 
studies could identify the additional constraints that municipalities with extreme levels 
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 CHAPTER 3 
CITY REVENUE STRUCTURES AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION 
Abstract 
Property taxes have been the most important own-source revenue for local 
governments, and normative theories of public finance highlight its strengths – broad-
base and stability. However, historical trends show that charges have been the main 
revenue source for cities since the late 1970s, and that their importance is increasing 
after the Great Recession. Using 2012 Census of Governments data for 2,396 cities, 
this paper explores how state policy, demography, and local context shapes local 
revenue structures. Regression results show property tax dependence is linked to 
higher state aid and home values, while charges dependence is linked to higher 
poverty and home value drops. Charges may be a useful tool for cities with high stress, 
but political pressures and urban context constrain this choice. Moreover, the narrow 
base, volatility, and potential regressivity of charges raise questions about their effects 
on community life and fiscal sustainability. Without higher-level efforts for spatial 




 The Great Recession has put public budgets in the spotlight (Keeley and Love 
2010). A narrative of wasteful public spending is widespread (Peck 2014) and anti-tax 
sentiments are high, as evidenced by the Tea Party movement. In a decentralized 
system of governance, locally raised revenues play an important role. Locally raised 
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revenues imply more local control over how much local governments tax and spend 
and can potentially mean more efficiency and accountability. 
 How local governments raise own-source revenues has implications for 
community life and fiscal sustainability. Property taxes have been the most important 
own-source revenue for local governments, and normative theories of public finance 
highlight the strengths of this tax (e.g. stable, broad-based, and efficient; Alm et al. 
2011; Musgrave 1983). Yet, recent work suggests property taxes alone are inadequate 
for meeting the needs of local governments (Bartle et al. 2011). The Government 
Finance Officers Association has recommended revenue diversification since the 
1990s (GFOA 1998) and scholars note local governments with a heavy reliance on one 
source of revenue may be particularly vulnerable to fiscal stress (Pagano and Johnston 
2000). 
 In the aftermath of the Great Recession, scholars note charges and fees are 
becoming a popular source of revenue for local governments (Langley 2016; Pagano 
2012). US Census of Governments (COG) data show growth in charges and fees for 
cities between 2007 and 2012 (6.8 billion in 2009 dollars) outpaced growth in property 
taxes (5.3 billion in 2009 dollars).8 Charges and fees are a way to bring in more 
revenues while tying the benefit of services to payments, but scholars warn charging 
users can raise equity issues as it can restrict marginalized groups from accessing 
services (Peck 2012). 
                                                 
8 This paper uses a broad definition of charges and fees that includes current charges, 
utility revenues, special assessments, and other license taxes. 
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 This is not to say property taxes are not regressive or exclusionary. School 
quality is capitalized in home values (Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011), and people 
who cannot afford to pay high property taxes can be excluded from access to higher 
quality schools. However, in cities with diverse households with diverse property tax 
bills, once someone becomes part of that community this person can use services that 
are financed by the general revenue. In the case of services with charges, even when 
the person is part of the community, this person faces an additional barrier to 
accessing the service. 
 Given the context of devolution, this paper asks how cities' dependence on 
property taxes and charges and fees differ by state policy, demography, housing 
market, and place characteristics. Property taxes and charges have different strengths 
and weaknesses, which can lead to different impacts on residents and the future of the 
municipal budget. Regression results from 2,396 US cities with a minimum population 
of 10,000 in metropolitan areas show property tax dependence is higher in cities with 
more capacity (greater state aid and home values), while charges dependence is higher 
in cities with more stress (higher poverty and metro core cities with home value 
drops). Charges may be a promising tool for cities under stress, but there are structural 
barriers to the use of charges and the narrow base and instability of this revenue source 
raise concerns of fiscal sustainability. The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. The next section reviews previous literature on state rescaling, potential 
sources of city stress and capacity, and link these to local revenue structures. This is 
followed by a description of data and methodology. Regression results and a 
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discussion of key findings follow, and the paper concludes with policy implications 
and directions for future studies. 
 
Literature Review 
 How do sources of city stress and capacity shape city revenue structures? This 
paper uses broad definitions of city stress (pressures of high service needs) and 
capacity (sources of revenue). In a multilevel governance system, state policies exert 
significant pressures on local government expenditures and revenues, but how 
localities respond to pressures from above depends on local context. This section 
reviews previous literature on devolution, sources of local stress and capacity, and 
how they are related to local revenues.  
Devolution and State Rescaling 
 Localities have always been “creatures of the state” subject to state law (Frug 
and Barron 2008). However, scholars noted sharp increases in state to local devolution 
in the 1990s (Nathan 1996). Political geographers warned devolution may harm equity 
and social justice (Brenner 2004). Their argument is as central governments transfer 
the responsibility of service provision to lower levels of government they also no 
longer follow a spatial Keynesian approach: directing central resources to places with 
more need. This means places with low ability to raise revenues and high levels of 
service need are unable to provide services that their residents need. 
Recently, Peck (2012) argued state governments are pushing fiscal stress down 
to the local level and forcing cities to engage in austerity urbanism. Austerity 
generally implies cutting back, but Peck (2012) defines austerity urbanism as 
eliminating or privatizing services and adopting more regressive revenue sources, such 
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as user fees and charges. These changes often bypass local democratic processes as 
states interfere through emergency managers (Loh 2016). State intervention is still rare 
across the US; 19 states have laws allowing them to intervene when local governments 
are under fiscal stress (Pew Charitable Trusts 2013). Nonetheless, scholars noted the 
increase in state intervention after the Great Recession (Hinkley 2015; Anderson 
2012). Lobao and Adua (2011) found diversity in local austerity and Cox (2009) 
argues spatial Keynesianism was never as strong in the US as Europe and emphasizes 
differences across states: “the USA has never had one welfare state, rather, it has had 
50 of them” (p. 114). 
 Empirical evidence on how state policy affects local finance is mixed. Xu and 
Warner (2016) found the role of state policy (decentralization and state aid) has 
different effects on local fiscal effort (locally raised revenue per capita/per capita 
income) across county areas. Using 2002 and 2007 COG data, they found the 
dominant relationship between decentralization and local effort is complementary 
(positive). In other words, local governments that shoulder a greater share of the state 
and local expenditure burden have higher local effort. However, in some places, this 
relationship was negative. For state aid, they also found a complementary (positive) 
relationship, those with higher state aid exhibited higher local effort. Based on 
national survey data of cities and counties in the 1990s, Pagano and Johnston (2000) 
also found higher intergovernmental aid is associated with higher revenue burdens for 
both cities and counties. 
Earlier research has found this can lead to vicious and virtuous cycles as local 
governments with more capacity receive more aid and those with less capacity receive 
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less (Warner and Pratt 2005). These outcomes will depend on how state aid is 
structured (e.g. competitive grants, matching grants). While some states explicitly use 
an equalization or needs factor (e.g. per capita income, per capita property value) in 
deciding aid distribution, there is no clear pattern or consistency in state aid 
distribution and little consideration for costs of local services (Fisher and Bristle 
2012). How cities respond to these pressures from the state level will depend on local 
context. 
Local Context: Demography, Housing Market, Place Characteristics 
At the local level, demography, housing market, and place characteristics 
shape city stress and capacity. Who lives in the city matters for local fiscal conditions, 
both because of the level of need and ability to pay. On the expenditure side, localities 
may have to spend more because people in poverty have higher need for public 
services (Pack 1998). On the revenue side, this may imply a smaller tax base to draw 
from. While studies of local government effort found local effort was lower in areas 
with higher poverty in the 1980s (Warner and Pratt 2005), studies in the 2000s find 
effort is higher in areas with higher need (Xu and Warner 2016). This could be a result 
of devolution mandating social welfare expenditures at the local level, regardless of 
fiscal capacity. 
Aging is another demographic factor with significant implications for public 
expenditures (Wolf and Amirkhanyan 2010). At the state and local levels, per capita 
spending increases sharply after age 75, reflecting costs of nursing home care and 
other services for elderly (Edwards 2010). Children also require more services from 
local governments (Warner and Morken 2013). Based on data from California 
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counties, MaCurdy and Nechyba (2001) found higher proportion of young (age 20 and 
below) are linked to more intergovernmental aid and lower tax revenues, while 
proportion of elderly (65 and above) did not affect revenue structures. The authors link 
these results to expenditure needs; the largest expenditure need for the young is 
education, and states provide more support for this category than other local 
expenditure needs. More recent studies show mixed results. Some find higher effort in 
places with more children and lower effort in places with more elderly (Xu and 
Warner 2016), while others find no relationship between elderly population and 
resource expansion strategies (e.g. increasing user fees; Lobao and Adua 2011). 
 Another source of city stress is the housing market. In several places where 
foreclosure stress was high, municipal fiscal stress followed (e.g. places in Nevada and 
Florida; Justice and Scorsone 2013). Scholars have pointed out foreclosures not only 
lead to financial, psychological, and social instability for families (Ross and Squires 
2011), but also to lower property values (Lin et al. 2009). For cities, this means less 
revenue or higher tax effort (since they need to increase the tax rate) and increased 
expenditure pressures due to increased community need. Cities may experience both 
demographic and housing market stress. Some scholars have found foreclosures were 
highest in suburbs with higher poverty (Schildt et al. 2013). This may lead cities to 
search for alternative revenue sources, such as user fees. 
Patterns of demographic stress and housing market stress are not spread out 
equally across space. Traditionally, suburbs have enjoyed higher income and lower 
poverty while inner cities have had higher poverty. A study by the Brookings Institute 
shows poor people living in inner cities are four times as likely to live in concentrated 
 122 
 
poverty as their suburban counterparts (Kneebone et al. 2011). Using Detroit and San 
Diego as examples, Peck (2012) cautions austerity urbanism is most severe in urban 
core cities, rather than the suburbs or rural places, where minorities and other 
marginalized populations are concentrated. His argument is social services are easy 
targets of austerity urbanism and urban core cities tend to have higher levels of these 
services. This can increase the gap between cities with strong growth pressures and 
cities with weaker growth prospects and higher need. Ross et al. (2015) found, while 
surveys indicate most cities suffered substantial revenue loss after the Great 
Recession, the 35 largest cities in the US were relatively stable, relying on their 
property taxes and deficit spending (because they have more net assets). Patterns of 
housing market stress are unclear, and thus the spatial distribution of local revenue 
structures is difficult to predict. Some found the foreclosure crisis was an inner city 
phenomenon (Immergluck 2010), while others have argued it was a suburban 
phenomenon (Lucy 2010). This may reflect the limitations of existing metro status 
categories. While suburbs as a whole have lower levels of need than cities in the metro 
core, scholars have identified emerging trends of poverty and nonwhite population 
growing faster in the suburbs (Frey 2015). 
Local Revenues 
 Theories of fiscal federalism make normative statements about local revenue 
sources, such as local governments should prefer property taxes over sales or income 
tax due to its stable, broad, and immobile base (Musgrave 1983; Peterson 1981). 
However, these theories do not explain the trend of local revenue diversification, 
specifically the decreasing reliance on property taxes and increasing reliance on other 
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sources of revenue (Krane et al. 2004). Empirical studies on local government revenue 
choices have focused on why local governments choose either the property tax or the 
income tax (Blackley and DeBoer 1987; Sjoquist 1981), even though income taxes at 
the local level are rare.9 Overall, these studies find property tax dependence is higher 
in places where tax exporting is more likely (Blackley and Deboer 1987). Studies have 
also examined the role of politics in tax base choices. Using a median voter model, 
Sjoquist (1981) examined the use of property taxes among the 45 largest US cities and 
found property tax reliance is higher in places with higher median income and more 
owner-occupied housing. 
Theoretically, the property tax has characteristics that make it an ideal source 
of local revenue: broad base, stability, and efficiency (Sjoquist and Stephenson 2010). 
Focusing on four states with severe housing market boom-bust cycles (Nevada, 
Florida, Arizona, California) and four states with less pronounced cycles (New York, 
Minnesota, Georgia, Colorado), Lutz et al. (2011) found local property tax revenues 
were fairly resilient to drops in housing price declines. Meanwhile, Scorsone and 
Plerhoples (2010) point out localities are less willing to raise taxes as a way to respond 
to fiscal stress since the early 2000s. Even before the most recent recession, Pagano 
and Johnston (2000) found property tax dependence is linked to slower growth in total 
revenue, which limits the locality’s capacity to build up reserves. 
 
 
                                                 
9 As of 2011, 4,943 jurisdictions in 17 states imposed a local income tax. Pennsylvania 
had the most number of jurisdictions imposing an income tax (2,961) (Henchman and 
Sapia 2011).  
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Figure 5. City Revenue by Source as a Percentage of Total Revenue, 1962-2012 
 
Data source: US Census Bureau, Census of Governments Historical Data. 
Note: Broad charges refer to current charges, utility revenues, special assessments, 
and other license taxes. 
 
Historical Census of Governments Finance data show property tax dependence 
has decreased and charges dependence has increased among cities (see Figure 5). In 
1962, property taxes were 35% of total revenue among cities. By 2012, this figure 
dropped to 19%. There are two potential reasons for this trend. First, the tax and 
expenditure limitations (TELs) movement that began in the late 1970s limited local 
authority over property taxes (Shadbegian 1999). Second, state aid to cities increased 
dramatically between 1962 (20 billion in 2009 constant dollars) and 1977 (56 billion 
in 2009 constant dollars), which allowed cities to decrease their dependence on 
property taxes. Reliance on property taxes and state aid were roughly equal throughout 
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constant 2009 dollars) between 2002 and 2012, and property taxes remain the second 
largest source of total revenue. 
 As TELs restricted property taxes, reliance on charges outpaced that of 
property taxes in the late 1970s (see Figure 5), and has remained the largest source of 
revenue for cities (34% of total revenue in 2012). Bartle et al. (2011) argue that the 
long-term decline in property taxes means charges are the only promising source of 
revenue for local governments. Using the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy’s Fiscally 
Standardized Cities (FisC) databases, Langley (2016) found cities that were more 
reliant on property tax and user charges fared better after the Great Recession. Charges 
are a broad category of revenues collected in exchange for a service. They range from 
fees for utilities (e.g. electric, gas, water), general services (e.g. sewerage, solid waste 
management), and use of public space (e.g. parks and recreation, parking facilities), to 
regulatory and administrative fees (e.g. licenses, building permits, developer fees, 
impact fees). In some places, local governments have increased fees for services that 
residents have little choice over consuming, such as fire protection or ambulance 
services. These fees are “non-traditional” (Sjoquist and Stoycheva 2012), but 
increasing (Pagano 2012). Census of Governments data report these in a broad 
category of “other charges (Census of Governments code A89),” thus information on 
these fees is limited. According to the International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA)’s 2009 State of the Profession survey (2,214 city and county 




 Charges have several strengths. First, charges allow those who do not use the 
service to not pay for it, enhancing horizontal equity (or "benefits principle"). Second, 
charges can reduce demand for the charge-financed service, thereby reducing 
expenditures (Sun and Jung 2012). This can have pro-social and pro-environmental 
impacts as well. For example, garbage tag fees incentivize residents to reduce trash 
and recycle (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2004). However, charges may be unpopular among 
politicians and bureaucrats due to their rigidity (Sjoquist and Stoycheva 2012); in 
many places, user fees must be used for a specific service, rather than being lumped 
into the general fund. The user control over how much services to consume and pay 
for implies less control over revenue collected by cities, compared to property taxes. 
Residents can always decrease or terminate the use of these services or leave the 
municipality, while it is more difficult to consume less housing or move a house. This 
raises questions about fiscal sustainability - ability to raise enough revenues to meet 
expenditure needs in the long term. Charges are also more invisible and less noticeable 
than property taxes. This may be a benefit to cities that need to raise revenues with 
minimum political costs, but may also lead to less accountability of city governments.  
 Another limitation of charges is their potential regressivity, but actual 
regressivity is difficult to estimate. On the one hand, the type of service will determine 
the regressivity of the fee. For example, a municipal golf course is a service lower 
income residents are less likely to use. Meanwhile, a flat fee ignores ability to pay. A 
progressive fee plan is a potential solution, but there is little information on how fees 
are structured across cities. Again, the International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA)’s 2009 State of the Profession survey provides some information. 
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Respondents were asked, “For services that are fee-based, how are they accessed by 
people who cannot afford the fee?” Among 1,725 places that charge user fees, 29% 
have a waiver of fee, 18% have a sliding scale, and 5% offer vouchers. If the user fee 
is a flat fee for all users, then the cost of the service is a larger proportion of income 
for low-income users. Martinez-Vasquez (2015) concedes charges could be regressive, 
but points out the elimination of charges based on the argument of regressivity could 
end up hurting the poor even more as the shortage in revenues could lead to 
elimination of the service. The poor generally have lower ability to switch to private 
service delivery options. He emphasizes that subnational governments are not 
appropriate for doing much redistribution and likens the regressivity of charges to the 
regressivity of food expenses. He warns, “Requiring subnational governments to set 
the fee levels below the actual costs of provision imposes an unfunded mandate and it 
can easily lead to poor provision of services” (p. 370). 
 Indeed, scholars recognize that revenue diversification can be a source of 
strength and capacity for localities, especially during times of fiscal stress (Shamsub 
and Akoto 2004). It can lower tax effort (Hendrick 2004), provide an effective way to 
operate under TELs (Mullins and Joyce 1996), and allow cities to maintain services in 
times of austerity by bringing in supplemental revenues through developer fees or 
impact fees (Warner and Clifton 2014). 10 This does not mean developer fees or impact 
                                                 
10 The question of who pays for impact fees (i.e. who bears the tax burden) will 
depend on the wider economic context (Dresch and Sheffrin 1997). Some possibilities 
are developers through lower profits and renters and homeowners if developers pass 
the costs down in the form of higher rents and prices. This paper limits its discussion 
to the impact fee’s role as an alternative source of revenue for local governments. 
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fees are not regressive, but they are alternative revenue sources that do not directly 
restrict the use of a service to those who pay. However, even when we view charges as 
a practical source of revenue, there are concerns for inequality among cities. In a case 
study of Tax Increment Financing in Chicago from 1996 to 2007, Weber (2010) found 
use of such alternative revenue sources is higher in places that have growth pressures. 
If alternative revenue sources are an effective tool for managing stress, they may be 
limited to places that are already doing well. 
Despite the variation in property taxes and charges dependence, few studies 
have looked at how these differ by place. An exception is Jung and Bae (2011) who 
examine charges dependence among counties between 1972 and 2002. They found 
demography and political institutions matter. In detail, denser counties with higher 
median household income have higher charges dependence. They explain richer 
counties may have higher demands for services that can be financed with charges. 
Charges dependence was also higher in counties with potentially binding local TELs 
and less federal and state aid. Similarly, Shadbegian (1999) found counties with TELs 
shift their revenue structures away from property taxes to charges and fees. However, 
counties under more stringent TELs (defined as limiting annual property tax growth to 
less than 5%) were unable to shift to more reliance on charges and fees. This may be 
due to political signals that TELs send – anti-tax sentiments are high. Netzer (1992) 
examined charges dependence of state and local governments (i.e. aggregating state 
and local revenues) and found higher income is associated with lower charges 
dependence. Netzer explains the reason for this is unclear, but one possibility is the 
income elasticity for collective goods (financed by taxes) is higher than for utility and 
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transportation services (more likely to be financed by charges). Thus, governments 
with higher income are more willing to finance collective goods with general taxes 
than user charges. This paper explores how state and local context shape city revenue 
structures after the Great Recession and expands the scope of analysis to all cities in 
metropolitan areas. 
 
Data and Methodology 
The analysis uses data on local government finances, demography, housing 
market, and place characteristics from 2012 Census of Governments (COG), 2005-
2009 and 2010-2014 American Community Survey (ACS),11 and 2000 and 2010 
Census. The unit of analysis is cities in metropolitan areas with a minimum population 
of 10,000. After merging COG, ACS, and Census data, the final dataset has 2,396 
cities (632 metro core, 1,764 suburban). Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics 
by metro status (Table 5) are presented below. 
Revenue structure. Dependent variables are property tax and charges and fees 
as a percentage of own-source revenue (total revenue less intergovernmental revenue; 
2012 COG). Increasing revenue diversity is a broad trend (Sjoquist and Stoycheva 
2012), but state context matters. According to the 2012 COG, property taxes were 
25% of total own-source revenues for cities, but this figure ranged from 4% in 
Oklahoma to 75% in Connecticut. 
                                                 
11 The American Community Survey reports five-year rolling averages. 
130 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics by Metro Status 
 Metro core Suburb Total 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Dependent Variables       
Property tax dependence (%)a 26.4 17.6 33.7 20.8 31.8 20.2 
Broad charges dependence (%)a 44.7 18.1 37.4 18.9 39.3 19.0 
Narrow charges dependence (%)a 23.4 11.3 19.8 11.2 20.7 11.3 
State Policy       
State aid per capita ($1000)a .309 .521 .193 .322 .223 .388 
State decentralization (%)a 54.1 6.5 55.3 5.73 55.0 6.0 
Tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) 
stringency 
17.8 8.9 18.4 8.5 18.2 8.6 
Demography       
Poverty (%)d 20.2 8.3 13.2 8.2 15.1 8.8 
Population under age 18 (%)d 22.6 4.4 24.7 5.0 24.2 4.9 
Population over age 65 (%)d 13.4 4.9 13.3 5.0 13.3 5.0 
Housing Market       
Ln median home valued 12.0 .565 12.2 .579 12.1 .580 
Median home value growth (%)d, e -11.7 14.6 -16.3 13.9 -15.1 14.2 
Place Characteristics       
Ln populationb 11.3 .973 10.1 .659 10.4 .913 
Population growth (%)b, c 12.9 39.2 31.0 128 26.3 112 
Housing unit growth (in thousands)d, e 1.56 6.12 .675 1.42 .909 3.39 
Controls       
Property tax per capita ($1000)a .490 .510 .453 .437 .463 .458 
Charges per capita ($1000)a .999 1.03 .580 .694 .690 .817 
N 632 1,764 2,396 
Data source: a 2012 US Census of Governments; b 2010 US Census; c 2000 US 
Census; d 2010-2014 American Community Survey; e 2005-2009 American 
Community Survey. 
Note: Property tax and charges dependence are measured as percentage of own source 
revenue (total revenue – intergovernmental revenue). Broad charges refer to current 
charges, utility revenues, special assessments, and other license taxes. Narrow charges 
refer to current charges only. State decentralization is the ratio of total local 
expenditures to total state and local expenditures converted to percentages. See Wen 
and Xu (2015) for more details on TELs stringency index. All financial variables are 





This study uses a broad definition of charges to include charges to individual 
users as well as developer fees by combining current charges, utility revenues (water, 
electricity, gas, transit), special assessments, and other license taxes. Categories under 
current charges include education, hospitals, highways, airports, parking facilities, sea 
and inland port facilities, natural resources, parks and recreation, housing and 
community development, sewerage, solid waste management, and “other.” For cities 
in 2012, electric power and water supply revenues were the largest category of charges 
(23% and 19% of total charges and fees, respectively), followed by sewerage (17%) 
and “other” charges (8%). Examples of “other” charges include ambulance service 
fees, alarm permits, fire response charges, and library fees (Sjoquist and Stoycheva 
2012). These are generally non-traditional services for user fees, and have been a 
source of controversy in the aftermath of the Great Recession (Pagano 2012). One 
problem is not all cities own municipal utilities, which are the largest source of 
charges. In order to tease out the difference between these broader charges and 
narrower charges, this paper models dependence on two types of charges: "broad 
charges" (current charges, utility revenues, special assessments, and other license 
taxes) and "narrow charges" (current charges only). 
Broad charges dependence varies across states, with the lowest dependence in 
Connecticut (18% of own-source revenue for cities) and highest dependence in 
Wyoming (75%). The national figure for cities was 43%. Property tax dependence is 
higher among suburbs, while broad and narrow charges dependence is higher in the 
metro core cities (see Table 5). 
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State policy. This study explores three ways state policy can affect cities. First, 
states can directly provide state aid to municipalities. Even though total state aid to 
cities has been declining since 2002, as of 2012, it remained the third largest source of 
total revenue for cities (15%). The models use state aid per capita to capture state 
assistance. Although previous studies have found a complementary relationship 
between state aid and local effort (Pagano and Johnston 2000; Xu and Warner 2016), 
it is unclear how property tax dependence is linked to state aid. Meanwhile, previous 
studies on charges dependence (Jung and Bae 2011) imply charges dependence will be 
lower in cities with more state aid. Descriptive statistics show state aid per capita is 
higher in metro core cities. 
Second, states can decentralize expenditure responsibilities to the local level 
through mandates or simply not delivering certain services, thereby indirectly pushing 
the responsibility to localities. There is no comprehensive dataset on the size of state 
mandates across the nation. Following previous studies (e.g. Mullins and Joyce 1996; 
Shamsub and Akoto 2004; Wallis and Oates 1988; Warner 2001; Xu and Warner 
2016), this study uses the ratio of local expenditure to total state and local government 
expenditures as a proxy for fiscal decentralization. This measure will be higher in 
places where localities are shouldering more of the total state and local expenditure. 
Property taxes and charges are more stable sources of revenue than sales tax or income 
tax (which only some states allow; see footnote 9). Thus, property tax dependence and 
charges dependence may be higher in cities with more decentralization. 
Third, states can restrict local ability to raise revenues through TELs. Wen and 
Xu (2015) measured TELs stringency for each state based on the methodology of 
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Mullins and Cox (1995) and data from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy’s 
Significant Features of the Property Tax database on tax limits. A state fixed effect can 
also control for state policy. However, the TELs stringency index gives more 
information on how state policy matters. The index reflects the magnitude of the limit, 
override provisions, and exclusions. The magnitude of the limit refers to the size of 
rate limits or maximum amount of allowable increase. Override provisions range from 
requiring approval by the electorate, governing body, or a third party (e.g. state board 
or court). Exclusions are items that are exempt from the TEL. Examples include debt 
service, new construction, emergency, capital outlay, etc. Each level of magnitude, 
override provisions, and exclusions are assigned a numeric score based on the 
stringency of each item to create sub-indices (higher number means greater 
stringency). The sub-indices are added to create a total stringency index. This index 
takes into account the different legislation applied to different types of local 
governments (i.e. counties, municipalities, school districts). This paper uses the 
municipalities index. The index ranges from 0 (Connecticut, New Hampshire, 
Vermont) to 36.5 (Colorado). California (30.5), Michigan (30.5), and Arizona (28) 
were also ranked high on this index. Based on previous studies on the impact of TELs 
(Joyce and Mullins 1991; Maher and Deller 2013), property tax dependence may be 
lower and charges dependence higher in cities with more stringent TELs. 
 Demography. Demographic stress is captured by poverty rates, percentage 
population under age 18 (“child population”), and percentage population over age 65 
(“elderly population”) (all 2010-2014 ACS).  Higher service needs for children and 
elders create special challenges for local governments (Edwards 2010; Warner and 
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Morken 2013; Wolf and Amirkhanyan 2010). If state rescaling pressures due to 
devolution have created an austerity urbanism form of governance that requires 
localities to prioritize fiscal discipline over community need (Peck 2012), cities with 
more poverty, elderly, and children may have higher charges dependence. In the case 
of child population, higher dependence on property taxes may reflect the high reliance 
on local property taxes for school funding (Kenyon 2007). 
 Housing Market. Property taxes remain an important source of local 
revenues. Housing market capacity is captured by median home values (ACS 2010-
2014). Growth in home values can signal a city has become more desirable to live in, 
while drops in home values can signal fiscal stress since localities will have a reduced 
property tax base. The change in median home value is calculated by subtracting the 
median home value in 2005-2009 (“period 1”) from the value in 2010-2014 (“period 
2”) and converting this number to a percentage of the original home value in period 1. 
All values are adjusted for inflation to 2012 dollars. A negative value indicates drops 
in median home values (“housing bust”). Positive values indicate median home value 
increases between the two periods. To capture the diversity of housing bust stress in 
suburbs, the models also include an interaction term for suburbs and home value 
change. Housing bust was more severe in suburbs (16.3% drop in median home 
values) than metro core cities (11.7% drop). 
 Cities with strong housing markets (higher home values, growth in home 
values) may rely more on property taxes, because property taxes are stable sources of 
revenue. Cities with strong housing markets have little incentive to search for new 
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revenue sources. In contrast, cities with declines in home values may have higher 
charges dependence, because they must search for alternative sources of revenue. 
Place characteristics. One purpose of this paper is to explore how the urban 
context shapes stress and revenue structures. Previous studies have shown there are 
urban and suburban differences in levels of need (Dalaker 2001). Using the 2010 US 
Census place definitions according to the Office of Management and Budget’s 2000 
standards (No. 08-01 Bulletin) and 2010 standards (No. 13-01 Bulletin), this paper 
created a metro status variable classifying principal cities in metropolitan statistical 
areas as metro core and the remainder of metropolitan statistical areas as suburbs. A 
dummy for metro core cities is added to see differences across metro status. 
The log of total population is included to control for size (2010 Census). The 
models have two measures of growth. The first is percentage population change (2000, 
2010 Census) to capture the impact of growth in size. The second is growth in housing 
units (2010-2014, 2005-2009 ACS) as a proxy for development pressures. This 
variable is created by subtracting the number of total housing units in 2005-2009 
(“period 1”) from total housing units in 2010-2014 (“period 2”). A large and positive 
number indicates more housing construction between the two periods. Previous 
literature identifying cities strategically use charges and fees (Warner and Clifton 
2014) indicate charges dependence will be higher in cities with more population 
growth and housing unit growth. Population growth was larger in the suburbs, while 
housing unit growth was larger in the metro core. 
Controls. Property tax dependence and charges dependence are shaped by 
other factors, such as a consolidated city-county structure, having a dependent school 
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district, and other revenue sources available to the city. Dummy variables for 
consolidated city-county governments, dependent school district, and other revenue 
sources (sales tax, income tax) were included to control for these effects. For the 
consolidated city-county variable, a list of consolidated city-county governments was 
obtained from the National League of Cities (NLC n.d.). A recent comprehensive list 
of dependent school districts is not available. City expenditures on elementary and 
secondary education were used as a proxy. Cities with any expenditures in this 
category were coded as having a dependent school district. Sales tax and income tax 
dummy variables were coded in the same manner to control for a city’s use of these 
revenue sources. 12 In contrast to sales or income tax, all cities use property taxes and 
charges. Charges per capita is included as a control variable in the property tax 
dependence model and property tax revenue per capita in the charges dependence 
model. 
 
Results: City Stress and Revenue Structure 
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions,13 this study examines how 
state policy, demography, housing market, and place characteristics are related to 
                                                 
12 In a model of revenue structure, controlling for other revenue sources is important. 
However, these control variables potentially create a mathematical problem because 
state aid, property taxes, charges, sales tax, and income tax are the majority of city 
revenues (they should add up to nearly 100%). This study uses dummy variables and 
percent of own-source revenue as the dependent variables to minimize the 
mathematical problem. 
13 The dependent variables are proportions, which raises concerns about using an OLS 
model, but the majority of dependent variables were between 20 and 80 (64% of 
property tax dependence; 80% of broad charges dependence). Furthermore, the results 
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property tax and charges dependence. State policy was measured in three ways: state 
aid, decentralization, and TELs stringency. Property tax dependence is linked to more 
state support and less constraints (see Table 6). A $1000 increase in state aid per 
capita is related to 7.5% increase in property tax dependence. This may be a reflection 
of education as the largest category of state aid to cities and heavy reliance on property 
taxes for education funding. TELs stringency is related to less dependence on property 
taxes, and reflects how most TELs target property taxes. Surprisingly, broad charges 
dependence is also lower in cities with more stringent TELs. Cities may be responding 
to the political pressures of residents’ aversion to taxes (signaled by the stringency of 
TELs), as well as pressures from the state level to shrink revenues overall. Meanwhile, 
the narrower category of current charges dependence has no statistical relationship to 
TELs stringency. These are smaller categories of charges that may be truly 
independent of any political constraints (easier to hide). Instead, narrow charges 
dependence is lower in cities with high rates of decentralization. State decentralization 
reflects real expenditure burdens on localities, and the volatility of current charges 
might make these revenue tools unattractive for localities with significant expenditure 
responsibilities. 
 In terms of demography, charges (both broad and narrow) dependence is 
higher in cities with more poverty. A 1% increase in poverty is related to .23% 
increase in dependence on broad charges and .1% increase on narrow charges. 
Camden, NJ is a city with high poverty and high levels of fiscal stress that has an 
                                                 
of tobit regression models are very similar to OLS results (see Appendix 3). The paper 
uses OLS results for ease of interpretation. 
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“average” dependence on broad charges (39.3%). Using Camden as an example, a 1% 
increase in poverty translates to $161,000 increase in broad charges revenue and 
$70,000 increase in narrow charges. Property tax dependence is lower in cities with 
higher percentage of child population. Property taxes are the main revenue source for 
school funding, but property tax dependence does not seem to reflect the need for 
school funding (at least, as measured by number of school-age children). Elderly 
population is not related to property tax dependence. In contrast, broad charges 
dependence is higher in cities with a higher percentage of child and elderly population. 
A 1% increase in the percentage of child population is associated with a .32% increase 
in charges dependence, while a 1% increase in the percentage of elderly population is 
associated with a .27% increase in charges dependence. Again, using Camden, NJ as 
an example, this translates to a $225,000 increase in charges with a 1% increase in 
child population and $190,000 increase in charges with a 1% increase in elderly 
population. This provides some support for the concerns of austerity urbanism 
scholars that fees are more common in places with more need. On the other hand, this 
shows the possibility of charges and fees as viable sources of revenue for cities with 
high need. However, cities with more concentration of children and elderly population 
do not rely more on narrow charges.
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as % of own 
source 
revenue 
State Policy    
State aid per capita ($1000)  7.520*** .413 1.549 
State decentralization (%)  .130 -.108 -.134** 
Tax and expenditure limitations 
(TELs) stringency  -.589*** -.210*** .036 
Demography    
Poverty (%) .046 .229*** .102** 
Population under age 18 (%) -.307*** .317** -.024 
Population over age 65 (%) -.155 .265** .049 
Housing Market    
Ln median home value 11.105*** -2.948** -2.038*** 
Median home value growth (%)  -.108* -.107* -.128*** 
Suburb*Median home value growth -.064 .152** .116** 
Place Characteristics    
Metro core (1=yes) -.292 3.925** 1.033 
Ln population  -1.737*** .017 .185 
Population growth (%) -.006* .002 -.001 
Housing unit growth (in thousands) -.272** .238* .083 
Controls    
Consolidated city-county (1=yes) 7.159 4.349 2.454 
Dependent school district (1=yes) 9.088*** -2.879 -5.580*** 
Sales tax (1=yes) -11.284*** -1.702 -1.580* 
Income tax (1=yes) -15.006*** -10.993*** -2.388** 
Charges per capita ($1000) -9.721***   
Property tax per capita ($1000)  -11.421*** -3.957*** 
Intercept -58.485*** 77.077*** 51.268*** 
Adjusted R2 .444 .173 .100 
Source: Author’s analysis of 2012 US Census of Governments; 2005-2009, 2010-
2014 American Community Survey; 2000, 2010 US Census. 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Values reported are OLS coefficients. N=2,396 
cities (632 metro core, 1,764 suburban) in metropolitan areas with population 10,000 
or more. Own source revenue is defined as total revenue less intergovernmental 
revenue. Broad charges refer to current charges, utility revenue, special assessments, 
and other license taxes. Narrow charges refer to current charges only. All financial 
variables are in 2012 constant dollars. See Wen and Xu (2015) for more details on 




 Higher median home values are linked to higher property tax dependence and 
lower charges dependence (both broad and narrow). A 1% increase in median home 
values is associated with .11% increase in property tax dependence and a .03% 
decrease in broad charges dependence and .02% decrease in narrow charges. For 
Camden, NJ, this translates to a $77,000 increase in property taxes and decreases of 
$21,000 and $14,000 in broad charges and narrow charges, respectively. This may 
reflect pragmatic management decisions by cities; cities with higher home values can 
apply a low tax rate on this stable, broad tax base and still raise enough revenue, 
without having to adopt a system of charges. Growth in home values is linked to lower 
property tax dependence. Cities with home value growth may also experience an 
overall growth in the local economy, leading to increases in other revenue sources 
(e.g. sales tax) and allowing them to rely less on property taxes. Urban context matters 
for the effect of home value growth on charges dependence. In metro cores cities, 
growth in home values is linked to less dependence on broad charges and decline in 
home values is associated with higher dependence on broad charges. Metro core cities 
with home value drops can rely on broad charges as alternative sources of revenue. In 
contrast, suburban cities with home value drops rely less on broad charges. 
Meanwhile, median home value growth is linked to less dependence on narrow 
charges, in both metro core and suburban cities. In other words, home value drops are 
linked to more dependence on narrow charges across all cities. Thus, narrow charges 
(rather than broad charges) seem to be a more promising tool for cities with housing 
busts, but suburbs are still using these tools to a lesser degree than metro core cities. 
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 Place characteristics show broad charges dependence is higher among metro 
core cities. On average, cities in the metro core have 3.9% higher dependence on 
broad charges, compared to cities in the suburbs. This may reflect user fees in cities 
with more urban services subject to charges. However, narrow charges dependence 
does not differ by metro status. Growth pressures were measured with population 
growth and housing unit growth. Cities with population growth and housing unit 
growth are less dependent on property taxes. These growing cities may also have 
growing economies that bring in other sources of revenue. Housing unit growth is 
linked to higher dependence on broad charges. This may reflect developer fees or 
impact fees in cities or increased utility revenues with more growth pressures. 
 The models included control variables that may shape city revenue structures. 
City-county consolidations were not associated with property tax or charges 
dependence, while dependent school districts were linked to higher property tax 
dependence, reflecting property taxes as the main source of revenue for schools. On 
average, cities with dependent school districts have 9% higher property tax 
dependence than cities without dependent school districts. Cities with dependent 
school districts have lower dependence on narrow charges. Ability to diversify 
revenue sources matters. Access to sales tax is related to lower property tax 
dependence and lower dependence on narrow charges. Cities with income taxes have 
15% lower property tax dependence and 11% lower charges dependence. Use of 
income tax also lowers current charges dependence by 2%. Given the limitations of 
property taxes and equity concerns of charges and fees, the income tax can be a 





 Cities have relied on property taxes and charges as their main source of 
revenues. However, reliance on property tax and charges differs by levels of stress and 
capacity. First, property tax dependence is higher in high capacity cities with greater 
median home values and state aid. These findings echo the normative claims of fiscal 
federalism that property taxes are the best sources of local revenue (e.g. Musgrave 
1983). This implies a virtuous cycle for cities with higher property tax dependence – 
cities that already have more state aid per capita and higher home values. The Great 
Recession highlighted property tax dependence as a source of strength and stability for 
cities (Alm et al. 2011). If so, these cities – which are already enjoying local capacity 
and low demographic stress – will continue to be resilient to economic downturns in 
the future. 
 Second, charges dependence is higher in cities with more poverty and lower 
home values. This shows the potential for cities with high stress and inadequate 
property tax base to use charges to maintain services. However, concerns for equity 
remain. If these charges are user fees, this revenue structure can further restrict service 
provision to marginalized segments of the city. Not only is this a problem from the 
consumer’s point of view (i.e. residents who cannot access these services), but this is 
also a problem for local government revenues. User fees restrict services to those who 
can pay. Fewer users can mean lower demand for services, but given that many 
charges are linked to services with high sunk costs (e.g. water, electricity, sewer, 
library), there may be limits on reducing service levels. Meanwhile, with fewer users, 
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the decline in total revenue is certain. The result can be a vicious cycle of lower 
revenues leading to even more reliance on fees, exacerbating demographic stress. User 
fees can certainly be designed in a progressive way, for example, to have lower fees 
for low-income residents. However, if one purpose of charges is to raise enough 
revenue to cover the costs of the service (Martinez-Vazquez 2015), this may be 
difficult for stressed cities. 
 Third, there are differences in the results of the broad charges and narrow 
charges models that highlight political, spatial, and economic barriers to the various 
charges and fees. Even though most TELs restrict property taxes, cities under more 
stringent TELs also have lower broad charges dependence. This is in line with the 
findings of Shadbegian (1999) for counties. Although cities have been using charges 
for a long time, the political pressures from residents and state governments matter. 
More studies are needed on these political barriers to charges and how cities address 
them. Broad charges require urban services that can be financed on an enterprise basis 
and growth pressures that attract developers. These conditions are not available in all 
cities. For example, while metro core cities with decline in home values are relying 
more on charges, suburbs with home value declines are not. Whether the lower 
reliance on charges is due to lower development pressures or greater resistance to fees 
by residents or local officials is unclear from this study. More research on stressed 
suburbs and their revenue strategies is necessary. Meanwhile, narrow charges seem to 
be more resistant to political pressures from the state or residents, but they remain a 
small percentage of own source revenues (20.7%). It is unlikely that narrow charges 
will be able to make up for any substantial shortfalls in property taxes or state aid. 
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 Comparing the models, the property tax model performs better (adjusted 
R2=.44) than the charges models (adjusted R2=.17 and .10 for broad charges and 
narrow charges, respectively). Given the large body of research on property taxes, 
elements of model structure are common and the findings of this study are in line with 
earlier studies (Alm et al. 2011; Bartle et al. 2011; Blackley and Deboer 1987; Joyce 
and Mullins 1991). In contrast, studies on charges are still scant even though they have 
been the largest revenue source for cities since the late 1970s. Charges are a broader 
category of revenue that includes both fees to users and developers, but Census of 
Governments data do not differentiate these two types of charges in detail. Given the 
national trend of increasing reliance on charges, future studies should develop better 
models for analyzing charges and data sources that can differentiate user and 
developer charges.   
 
Conclusion 
 How local governments raise revenues matters for community needs and fiscal 
sustainability. Traditional theories of public finance argue local governments should 
primarily use property taxes. However, national trends show charges have been the 
main revenue source for cities since the late 1970s and are becoming more popular. 
This study found cities with high capacity and low stress are following the 
prescriptions and relying more on property taxes. However, property tax dependence – 
celebrated for its broad base and stability – does not show promise for stressed cities. 
Instead, cities under stress are relying more on charges. Thus, charges can be a useful 
tool for cities with weak property tax bases and high need, but the use of this tool is 
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restricted by structural barriers that cities have little control over. Furthermore, charges 
are more volatile than property taxes and have a narrower base. In the event of another 
recession, cities with a high reliance on charges may be vulnerable to fiscal stress. 
Absent increased assistance from higher levels of government for spatial 
redistribution, inequality among cities that collect enough revenues with property 
taxes, cities that can and do use charges, and those unable to use charges will increase.
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as % of own 
source 
revenue 
State Policy    
State aid per capita ($1000)  7.515*** .411 1.550 
State decentralization (%)  .129 -.109 -.133** 
Tax and expenditure limitations 
(TELs) stringency  
-.590*** -.210*** .036 
Demography    
Poverty (%) .044 .228*** .102** 
Population under age 18 (%) -.306*** .318*** -.024 
Population over age 65 (%) -.155 .265** .049 
Housing Market    
Ln median home value 11.092*** -2.953** -2.036*** 
Median home value growth (%)  -.108* -.107* -.128*** 
Suburb*Median home value 
growth 
-.064 .152** .116** 
Place Characteristics    
Metro core (1=yes) -.316 3.913** 1.040 
Ln population  -1.717*** .027 .181 
Population growth (%) -.006* .002 -.001 
Housing unit growth (in thousands) -.272** .238* .083 
Controls    
Consolidated city-county (1=yes) 7.136 4.340 2.458 
Dependent school district (1=yes) 9.077*** -2.878 -5.580*** 
Sales tax (1=yes) -11.279*** -1.701 -1.580* 
Income tax (1=yes) -15.015*** -11.000*** -2.385** 
Charges per capita ($1000) -9.723***   
Property tax per capita ($1000)  -11.429*** -3.953*** 
Intercept -58.456*** 77.074*** 51.269*** 
Log-Likelihood -9890.384 -10209.270 -9079.804 
Source: Author’s analysis of 2012 US Census of Governments; 2005-2009, 2010-2014 
American Community Survey; 2000, 2010 US Census. 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Values reported are tobit coefficients. N=2,396 cities (632 
metro core, 1,764 suburban) in metropolitan areas with population 10,000 or more. Own 
source revenue is defined as total revenue less intergovernmental revenue. Broad charges refer 
to current charges, utility revenue, special assessments, and other license taxes. Narrow 
charges fer to current charges only. All financial variables are in 2012 constant dollars. See 
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LIMITS OF FISCAL FEDERALISM: HOW POLITICAL NARRATIVES ERODE 
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY IN UPSTATE NEW YORK 
Abstract 
Local governments can be efficient under fiscal federalism, but can they achieve fiscal 
sustainability? Using a case study of Upstate New York, this paper argues the political 
and fiscal incentives in the current federal system encourage local governments to 
maintain services without adequate revenues. A narrative of inefficient local 
governments allows the State and citizens to exert pressures that de facto eliminate 
local government choices to raise revenues through property taxes or charges. The 
consequences are expenditure cuts across the board and lack of long-term planning. 
Counter-narratives are weak as the State can claim lowering taxes without service 
cuts, and citizens believe they can enjoy the same services with lower taxes. Local 
officials see the erosion of fiscal sustainability, but face political and fiscal barriers for 
collective action. More balance of power in state-local relationships and a narrative 
that better connects local taxes and local services are necessary. 
 
Introduction 
Fiscal stress among local governments is a widespread concern after the Great 
Recession (Levine et al. 2013; Pagano 2013). The limits on raising own-source 
revenues and the position of local governments at the bottom of the federal hierarchy 
mean fiscal stress may be structural and chronic for local governments (Pagano and 
Johnston 2000; Osborne and Hutchinson 2005). However, local governments are 
responsible for delivering many services, because theories of fiscal federalism predict 
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that when local governments compete with each other they can deliver residents the 
services they want at the lowest cost (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972). Can local 
governments do this over time, especially during recessions and afterwards? 
 This paper answers this question by examining how politics (often implicit) 
shape local government choices in Upstate New York. Using a lens of narratives, this 
paper shows how pressures from the State and citizens constrain revenue-raising 
options and expenditure cuts, threatening fiscal sustainability. The paper begins with a 
review of previous literature on fiscal federalism and narratives to build the argument 
that fiscal federalism may not deliver fiscal sustainability. A brief background of the 
case and details of methodology follow. The next section describes the narrative of 
inefficient local governments in New York, its consequences, and why a counter-
narrative is unlikely to emerge. The paper concludes with a discussion of the limits of 
fiscal federalism and policy implications. 
 
Fiscal Federalism and Narratives 
Theories of fiscal federalism show the possibility of more productive 
efficiency (producing goods and services at lowest cost) and allocative efficiency 
(producing goods and services that meet resident demands) in a decentralized system 
in which local governments compete with each other (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972). 
However, they are no strangers to the potential dangers of decentralization 
(Prud’Homme 1995). Rather than trusting that public officials will “do what is best for 
the public,” scholars have suggested institutional safeguards against these dangers. 
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One example is the use of tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) to keep the 
size of local budgets in line with citizen preferences (i.e. the Leviathan problem; 
Brennan and Buchanan 1979). However, TELs also have implications for state-local 
relationships. The earliest TELs, including California’s Proposition 13, were 
referendums initiated by citizens, but the majority of TELs since 1978 have been 
initiated by state legislatures (Berman 2003). Today, 47 states restrict local revenues, 
expenditures, or both in some way (Mullins 2010). In general, studies find TELs do 
not shrink the overall size of state and local governments, shift local revenue 
structures towards non-property tax revenues, and increase local reliance on state aid 
(Mullins 2004; Shadbegian 1998). The outcome for fiscal sustainability – defined as 
“the ability of governments to meet existing program commitments with existing 
resources not only in current terms but into the future” (Ward and Dadayan 2009, 
p.456) – may be more promising.14 In a national study of TELs stringency and 
municipal financial conditions, Maher and Deller (2013) found TELs may force 
localities to build up reserves and control debt, improving fiscal management. 
Another potential danger in a federal system is the soft budget constraint 
(Kornai 1986) that incentivizes local governments to spend beyond their capacity 
because they believe the state or federal government will bail them out (Goodspeed 
2002; Rodden et al. 2003). One solution is state governments imposing rules that force 
                                                 
14 Some scholars have used the term “dynamic efficiency” to describe the balance 
between current and future consumption (e.g. Andrews and Entwistle 2013; 
Ghemawat and Ricart I Costa 1993). However, the dominant use and interpretation of 
“efficiency” has been focused on productive efficiency or maximizing output per unit 
of input (Rutgers and van der Meer 2010). To avoid confusion, this paper uses the 
term fiscal sustainability rather than dynamic efficiency. 
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fiscal discipline, such as constitutional limits on local government debt and balanced-
budget requirements (Oates 2005). The underlying assumption is localities will not 
practice such discipline voluntarily, and researchers have focused on the role of state 
governments to prevent local fiscal crises after the Great Recession (e.g. Coe 2008; 
Pew Charitable Trusts 2013; Sapotichne et al. 2015). Emergency managers, state 
receiverships, and financial control boards are popular measures that could potentially 
improve fiscal sustainability by forcing structural changes, but raise concerns about 
the loss of democratic procedures (Anderson 2012). 
A third danger in a decentralized system in which local governments compete 
for capital is underprovision of public goods (Oates 1972; Zodrow and Mieszkowski 
1986). Mandates are one way to solve this problem, but they also have been the source 
of contention between state and local governments (Zimmerman 2012). Over half of 
the states have adopted constitutional amendments or statutes for mandate relief 
(Zimmerman 2012), such as requiring cost estimates or some level of reimbursements, 
but states can always ignore these and localities have few options for recourse 
(Berman 2003). Using a public choice framework, Zelinsky (1993) explains unfunded 
mandates are the results of poorly monitored state legislators who spread the costs of 
services with concentrated benefits across the state. He argues unfunded mandates 
require structural solutions, rather than technical solutions on the margins to 
legislative processes. 
This explanation of unfunded mandates is in line with the legislative view 
(Peterson 1995) or competitive view (Nicholson-Crotty and Theobald 2010) of 
federalism – each level of government tries to shift costs to other levels and claim 
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credit for delivering benefits to voters. Empirical studies show states cutting 
expenditures and state aid when under fiscal stress, thereby indirectly pushing service 
responsibility to local governments (Jimenez 2009; Reschovsky 2004). Using survey 
data on cities and counties in the 1990s, Pagano and Johnston (2000) cautioned local 
governments may be unable to maintain or expand services when devolutionary 
pressures overlap with recessions. Although national studies after the Great Recession 
find service shedding among local governments is limited (Lobao and Adua 2011; 
Kim and Warner 2016), Peck (2014) has argued state governments are pushing blame 
for any fiscal failures (in addition to actual fiscal stress) to the local level. 
Furthermore, Hinkley (2015) found narratives of local mismanagement as the cause of 
fiscal crises justified state intervention in the form of structural adjustment (rather than 
state assistance) in Detroit, Dallas, Philadelphia, and San Jose. 
A focus on politics illuminates the power of narratives and framing. 
Narratives and frames shape our decisions on which issues are worthy of further 
consideration and their solutions (Lakoff 2004; Stone 2012). This paper uses a broad 
definition of narratives and framing to refer to a chronological account of political 
issues with characters and normative claims. Frames shape citizens’ attitudes on a 
variety of issues (Chong and Druckman 2007), including those on public spending 
(Jacoby 2000). While some works have studied the power of presidents in framing 
(e.g. Druckman and Holmes 2004; Neustadt 1990), there is less work on how states or 
local governments use framing. An “austerity narrative” (Blyth 2013) after the Great 
Recession may explain the dominant expenditure-cutting responses in the public 
sector, rather than tax increases (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010). A single issue can 
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have multiple narratives and frames, and what makes a narrative more or less powerful 
is a topic that needs further study (Chong and Druckman 2007). In crisis studies, 
scholars find agents that communicate proactively (rather than simply reacting) are 
able to advance their frames more effectively (Boin et al. 2009; Ulmer et al. 2007).  
When narratives interact with cognitive limits or biases, the outcomes in 
public finance may not be as rational as previous theories predict (McCaffery and 
Slemrod 2006). For example, Lowery (1998) argues citizens often have insufficient or 
incorrect information that lead to preference errors in decentralized governance 
systems. Using online experiments, McCaffery and Baron (2003) find participants are 
unable to integrate multiple components of a tax system (“disaggregation bias”) and 
show different preferences for tax systems depending on whether the change in tax 
rates are stated in dollars or percent terms (“framing effect”). People also have a 
present bias (i.e. discounting the future “too much”) that makes it difficult to save for 
the future (Laibson et al. 1998), and furthermore, people tend to treat future selves as 
others (Pronin et al. 2008). 
Given these biases, one can expect citizens to 1) struggle with understanding 
the tax-services bundle provided by different governments in a federal system (Lyons 
et al. 1992); 2) prefer lower taxes today over public service benefits in the future; and 
3) consistently underestimate the cost of services (Glaser and Denhardt 1999; Winter 
and Mouritzen 2001). Lastly, people are unlikely to notice marginal changes in 
services as the slow change moves the cognitive baseline for what is “normal” (also 
known as a “creeping normalcy” effect; Diamond 2005). 
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Under a fiscal federalism structure wherein states have incentives to push 
down costs to localities and citizens have incentives to push costs to the future, the 
burden of these choices may land on local governments. Using a case study of Upstate 
New York, this paper shows how a narrative of inefficient local governments exerts 




New York State (NYS) has many elements that scholars have pointed to as 
structural issues in urban governance. With the exception of New York City, large 
parts of Upstate New York have declining industries, decaying infrastructure, 
outmigration of the middle class, and concentrated poverty (Bacheller 2015). Home to 
1,600 local governments (57 counties, 62 cities, 552 villages, 929 towns; 2012 COG), 
NYS is a high taxing and high spending state, as well as a highly decentralized state. 
According to the 2012 Census of Governments data, NYS ranks first in local revenues 
and expenditures per capita ($6,962 and $7,710, respectively) and second in local 
expenditures as a percentage of total state-wide public expenditures15 (49%). 
NYS also has high property taxes. According to a Tax Policy Center report, 
NYS ranks 10th in the nation for property taxes as a percentage of home values over 
the 2007-2011 period (Harris and Moore 2013; 1.51percent). Governor Andrew 
Cuomo (first elected in 2010, re-elected in 2014) chose this issue as the centerpiece of 
                                                 
15 Total state-wide public expenditures are aggregate expenditures of general-purpose 
local governments, special districts, school districts, and state government. 
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his policy platform. Under Governor Cuomo, the NYS legislature adopted a property 
tax levy limit in 2011 (“tax cap”; 2011 Laws of New York Chapter 97). Initially 
adopted as a temporary measure, the tax cap was extended for another four years in 
2015. The tax cap has commonly been described as limiting the property tax levy of 
all local governments and school districts outside New York City to 2% or the rate of 
inflation, whichever is lower. In practice, the tax cap is calculated for each local 
government based on a lengthy two-step process (see Appendix 4). Since 2014, the 
allowable levy growth factor has been less than 2% due to low inflation rates. In 2016 
the growth factor was 0.73% for counties, cities, and towns and 0.12% for villages 
(OSC 2016). 
In addition to the tax cap, the Legislature passed a Property Tax Freeze Credit 
Law (2014 Laws of New York Chapter 59 Part FF) that rewards residents of local 
governments that stay under the tax cap and submit a Government Efficiency Plan 
(GEP). The GEP should demonstrate how the locality plans to achieve 1% savings in 
property tax levy through cooperation agreements, shared services, mergers, and 
efficiencies for the next three years. Any reforms implemented before the tax cap are 
ineligible. In effect, this penalizes localities that are early adopters of cost-saving 
innovations. If the GEP is approved by the NYS Division of Budget and the locality 
abides by the tax cap, the residents of that locality receive a check from the State that 





Case studies offer in-depth inquiries of contemporary phenomena within a 
real-life context (Yin 2009). This study uses data from a variety of sources: focus 
group interviews; observations (see Appendix 5); interviews with state-wide local 
association leaders, legal experts, community leaders, and scholars; Office of State 
Comptroller (“Comptroller”) local government finance data and reports; media 
reports; and secondary survey data. Data from five focus groups held between 
September 2015 and February 2016 with 83 local government officials in Upstate 
New York (see Table 7) are the main focus of this paper. Approximately 2/3 of focus 
group participants were middle-aged white males, while the remaining 1/3 were 
females. Most participants were elected officials – county executives, county 
legislators, city mayors, village mayors, town supervisors – but some were 
administrative personnel, such as budget and finance directors, human resources 
commissioners, and finance commissioners. Approximately 1/4 of focus group 
participants mentioned they had more than ten years of experience in local 
government. 
The study used purposive sampling to cover all general purpose local 
government types (county, city, town, village) and regions within the State. Three of 
the four focus groups were held at annual meetings of state-wide associations, 
representing county officials (New York State Association of Counties; NYSAC), 
town officials (Association of Towns of the State of New York; AOT), and city and 
village officials (New York Conference of Mayors; NYCOM). The research team also 
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made an effort to cover regions that represent the variety across NYS – one in the 
western region (Erie County) and another in the Hudson Valley (Dutchess County). 
The focus groups were semi-structured round-table discussions and 
approximately 60 minutes in length. The following three questions guided the 
discussions: 
 
1) What are the main causes of fiscal challenges for your government? 
2) How has your government responded to revenue challenges? 
3) What are some changes your government has made in service delivery to 
address fiscal challenges? 
 
Table 7. New York State Focus Group Details 
Location Date Participants ID 




9 county representatives from 







42 village, town, county, and 
state representatives from 






14 village, town, and county 
representatives from across 
Dutchess County 
Dutchess 




8 village and city officials from 
New York Conference of 
Mayors (NYCOM) 
NYCOM 




10 town officials from 
Association of Towns of the 
State of New York (AOT) 
AOT 
Note: The Amherst, New York focus group was conducted as part of a workshop 
course. Researchers trained a group of graduate students who conducted seven parallel 





Moderators (two researchers) posed these questions and limited their 
comments to follow-up or clarification questions. All focus groups were recorded and 
transcribed.16 Each focus group was followed by a debrief meeting of researchers to 
discuss key findings and identify any modifications for the next focus group. Based on 
these preliminary analyses, an interim report focusing on the drivers of fiscal 
challenges was published online (Anjum et al. 2015). These preliminary findings have 
been triangulated with feedback from research directors and members of local 
government associations. 
The analysis combined the manual coding process in a grounded approach 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998) and Friese (2014)’s “notice-collect-think” approach. First, 
manual coding with repetitive readings of transcripts was used to identify key themes. 
This was followed by a combination of inductive and deductive coding (focusing on 
the three guiding questions) in ATLAS.ti. Responses by government type were noted, 
but the main focus was identifying common themes across all focus groups and 
government types. Focus group findings were triangulated with additional data sources 
mentioned above. The next three sections describe the narrative of inefficient local 
governments in NYS, its consequences for local fiscal sustainability, and the barriers 
to creating a counter-narrative. 
 
                                                 
16 The data for the Amherst, New York focus group are from detailed notes of research 
assistants who moderated each of the seven concurrent focus groups. 
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The Blame Game 
In the focus groups, local officials described an “anti-local government” 
narrative that blames local governments for high tax burdens in NYS. One official 
summarized it as follows: “…the Governor's perspective [] is you're the problem, 
you're the reason our taxes are going up” (Dutchess). The State uses two arguments in 
this narrative: 1) local property taxes are too high and 2) there are too many local 
governments. When the State adopted the tax cap, Governor Cuomo released a video 
(available at www.reforminggovernment.ny.gov) in which he states local property 
taxes in NYS are “simply out of control” and that the tax cap is about “putting you and 
your neighbors back in control of your community’s spending.” In the same video, 
Cuomo argues there are over 10,500 local governments in NYS that are “wasteful and 
very, very expensive.” 
The quantitative data do not support this narrative. Local government finance 
data from the Comptroller show property tax revenues have been flat between 2007 
and 2015, even before the tax cap (see Figure 6). Sales tax and charges – the other 
major own-source revenues – have also remained relatively flat, while state aid 
decreased by $1 billion (in real terms). As for the number of local governments, the 
2012 Census of Governments shows 3,453 local governments (1,600 general-purpose 
local governments, 1,174 special districts, and 679 independent school districts; 
including New York City) in NYS. The State ranks 27th in number of local 





Figure 6. New York State Local Government Revenues Trends by Source, 2007-2015 
 
Data source: New York State Office of State Comptroller, Local Government Data. 
Note: Figures are aggregate revenues of all general-purpose local governments 
(counties, cities, towns, villages) in New York State, excluding New York City. All 
figures have been adjusted for inflation. 
 
The mismatch in numbers may be an issue of defining local governments. 
Governor Cuomo is counting the approximately 6,900 town-only special districts 
across the State, which is misleading. Most town special districts were established 
under Articles 12 and 12-A of the New York State Town Law (1932 Laws of New 
York Chapter 634), and are governed by the town board. These districts were 
authorized by the State when population growth in the suburbs were increasing, and 
there were insufficient tax bases and voter support for urban services, such as water 



























































provide services to residents who wanted them (OSC 2007). Regardless, Cuomo 
continued to use this narrative of local government waste and inefficiency during his 
2014 reelection campaign. 
The video with misleading figures on the number of local governments and 
trends of property taxes are posted on a website titled, “Cap NY Property Taxes – A 
Citizen’s Guide”17 and citizens seem to echo this narrative. A 2015 survey of 
registered voters shows 73% of respondents agree that the tax cap has kept school and 
local taxes down (Siena Institute 2015). Even before the tax cap, a 2011 survey of 
residents found 54% of respondents think there are too many local governments 
(Dyson Foundation 2011) and another 2011 survey found 73% of respondents 
supported Governor Cuomo’s proposed tax cap (Blakely-Armitage and Kay 2011). 
 While the State has crafted a strong narrative of local government inefficiency, 
the communications between the State and local governments have been cloudier. 
Local officials were confused about the State’s intention as the State presented service 
sharing and local restructuring (consolidations and dissolutions) as the best solutions 
for the high property tax problem. However, local governments in NYS have a long 
history of sharing services and New York residents have not supported local 
restructuring. A 2013 survey of local governments in Upstate New York found the 
average length of shared service agreements was 18 years (Homsy et al. 2013) and 
according to the Division of Local Government Services (in the Department of State) 
                                                 
17 Governor Cuomo launched this website in November 2011 as a component of his 




data there have been 47 successful dissolutions between 1900 and 2012. Arguing that 
the low dissolution rates are due to procedural complications, the State Legislature 
adopted the “New N.Y. Government Reorganization and Citizen Empowerment Act” 
(General Municipal Law Article 17-A) in 2009 to make consolidation and dissolution 
procedures easier. Under this new law, there have been 11 successful dissolutions (out 
of 34 votes). 
Notwithstanding these histories, the State created various grants and programs 
to encourage local governments to share services and consolidate. One example is the 
Municipal Restructuring Fund established in the 2015-16 state budget to “stimulate 
permanent property tax reductions resulting from shared services and consolidations 
between local governments” (DOS 2016). According to a report from NYCOM 
(2016), of the $150 million set aside for this fund, there was $0 spent in 2015 due to 
low interest and insufficient time for localities to apply. 
 
Kicking the Can Down the Road 
The short-term consequences of this narrative were timid revenue responses 
and expenditure cuts on the margins due to pressures from the State and citizens. 
Local officials lamented, “we're really just kinda kicking the can down the road” 
(Dutchess). 
On the revenue side, local governments have two options: raise property taxes 
and/or raise charges and fees.18 Proponents of the tax cap point to the override option 
                                                 
18 Other options include debt and use of reserve funds, but focus group participants did 
not mention these as a dominant response to fiscal stress. The New York State 
Constitution limits the amount of debt local governments can have, and the 
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– requiring a 60% vote of the governing board (i.e. 3 out of 5 members) – that is easy 
in principle. In practice, local officials noted the widespread narrative of local 
government inefficiency makes this choice politically difficult. Figures from the 
Comptroller reflect local governments’ reluctance to attempt overrides. The proportion 
of local governments planning to override the tax cap decreased from 30% in 2013 to 
18% in 2015 (OSC 2016). When a state senator pointed to the override option, a local 
official asked, "what's he [the Governor] going to do then?" (Erie). Local officials 
were wary of punishments – both political (override attempts support the Governor’s 
rhetoric of wasteful local governments) and fiscal (further cuts in state aid). 
The political pressures from citizens were also strong. When asked whether 
overriding the tax cap was an option, local officials answered, “If you don’t want a 
job” (Dutchess). A town supervisor emphasized, “We have never passed a cap. We 
will never pass the cap” (AOT). Participants noted the powerful combination of the 
tax cap and the tax freeze check, which is a visual reminder for residents on whether 
their local governments stayed under the cap. One participant explained, “You go over 
the cap, and it's like you've just taken people's first child” (NYCOM), while another 
noted the political shrewdness of the program: “It’s an excellent PR scheme. It’s 
marketed beautifully. This tax freeze with this rebate, you have an override, you don’t 
get your…at the end of the day $28 rebate” (NYCOM). According to the New York 
                                                 
Comptroller’s data show total outstanding debt for local governments decreased from 
$22.5 billion in 2011 to $21.1 billion in 2015 (in 2009 dollars). The use of reserve 
funds seems to be an option that has already been exhausted. According to 
Comptroller data in 2013, 93% of counties, 69% of cities, 49% of towns, and 54% of 
villages had low fund balances (defined as a fund balance less than 10% of 
expenditures; OSC 2015). 
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Department of Taxation and Finance data, the highest average check was $471 in 
Scarsdale (the richest municipality in the Lower Hudson Valley region with high 
home values), while 138 upstate districts had an average check of less than $25 
(Empire Center 2015). Others have called the tax freeze check a “bribe” and “political 
gimmick,” noting the money has to come from somewhere (i.e. tax sources) and the 
administrative burden of sending individualized checks to each homeowner is 
significant. 
Given the political limits on property taxes, local officials were searching for 
revenues through fees and charges. However, there were also barriers to these revenue 
sources from both the State and citizens. One official noted: 
 
My sense is any fees19 that have been approved by home rule 
legislation in the past will not likely be approved by home rule 
request in this administration with this legislature. We've basically 
seen the door slammed down shut and tight on any requests for what 
other municipalities have done in the past. (NYCOM) 
 
                                                 
19 This discussion was specifically about fees for birth and death certificates. The 
statutory fee that local governments can charge for vital records has been equal to that 
of what the State Department of Health charges. However, in 2003, the State increased 
its fee to $30 without a corresponding increase for localities. Since then, the State 
Legislature has allowed four counties and one city to increase their fees (NYCOM 
“Stop the Taxshift” website). Individual municipalities have asked the State for 
permission to increase these fees (e.g. City of Albany, City of Amsterdam), but the 
Legislature has not passed these bills. 
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 Local officials were reading messages from the State Legislature that 
they should not be raising more revenues – whether this be through property 
taxes, other taxes, or fees – and there was uncertainty about whether local 
governments could use new fees. For example, the City of Rochester charges 
user fees for snow plowing, salting, and cleaning streets and City of Ithaca has 
a storm water fee. When moderators mentioned these examples, a local official 
said: 
 
Road maintenance is a general service that a municipality has to 
provide…. We can't necessarily charge a fee for a general service in 
New York State. However, Rochester does. For whatever reason, 
they've been doing it for 20, 25 years. (NYCOM) 
 
Conversations with research directors at state-wide associations confirmed local 
governments are allowed to institute new fees without state approval per municipal 
home rule (New York Municipal Home Rule Law Section 10); however, fees are 
strictly defined as charges for those services that benefit a specific user, rather than the 
general public. In the opinion of the Comptroller, any “fees” (regardless of what they 
are called) that are imposed to support a local government without regard for the 
benefits of a service user, is a tax. Any new taxes require state approval as the power 
of taxation belongs to the State per Article XVI of the State Constitution. A 1994 
opinion of the Comptroller states that local governments should not charge a fee for 
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snow removal (OSC 1994). However, research directors of local government 
associations confirmed some municipalities do so. 
On the citizen side, unwillingness to pay for services was widespread. One 
official explained, “I get more concern every year if we raise our tipping fee at the 
dump five dollars. I will get more calls on that than I will a percent on the whole 
budget” (NYSAC). Another official explained: 
 
People want these things and whenever you increase the use of 
[fees], it's a nuisance tax almost. Yesterday I didn't have to pay for 
this…Now I have to pay to use this park or I have to pay to use my 
library or whatever it is. (NYSAC) 
 
Expenditure responses were similarly timid in that local officials were cutting 
with caution due to legal and political barriers. Comptroller’s data show local 
expenditures have decreased in most categories (see Figure 7), with the largest 
expenditure cuts in social services, health, and public safety. The large increase in 
employee benefits reflects the strong union protections in NYS from the Taylor Law 
and Triborough Amendment. The Taylor Law grants public employees the right to 
organize, elect union representatives, and collectively bargain with employers. The 
Law prohibits unionized workers from going on strike, and in turn the Triborough 
Amendment requires that the terms of the old contract must be upheld until a new 




Figure 7. Changes in New York State Local Government Expenditures by Category, 
2011 to 2015 
 
Data source: New York State Office of State Comptroller, Local Government Data. 
Note: Figures are dollar changes in aggregate expenditures (adjusted for inflation) of 
all general purpose local governments (counties, cities, towns, villages) in New York 
State, excluding New York City 
 
Local officials emphasized they had not eliminated services yet, and have 
focused on cutting down personnel costs. One official explained, “We've ended up 
downsizing staff. We have created more work for several employees over the last 
several years in order to compensate. Are our savings significant? Not really” (AOT). 
According to the NYS Department of Labor data, Upstate New York lost 18,200 local 
government jobs between 2011 and 2015 (6% drop). One official noted, “We were 































local officials] were all too. It's not just me…. We were doing all these things ahead of 
time” (AOT). Indeed, the NYS Department of Labor data show local government 
employment in Upstate New York started declining in 2010, and decreased by 27,500 
jobs (9% drop) between 2009 and 2015. 
In sum, local officials described operating in a “crisis mode,” rather than a 
long-term planning mode. Focus group participants used phrases like, “hit the wall” 
(NYCOM), “waiting for the other shoe to drop” (Dutchess), “nowhere to go” 
(NYCOM), and “reached the end of the road” (NYCOM) to describe their situation. 
 One participant used a household analogy to explain how local governments 
have tried to maintain service levels: 
 
Everyone has dug through the closet and found everything they can 
and looked inside the couch and pulled out all the coins and figured 
[out] everything we can cut back. We're at the point of starting to 
burn the furniture to heat the house. (NYCOM) 
 
There is no state-wide data on service degradation, but in the absence of radical 
increases in productive efficiency, the $1.7 billion (2009 dollars) cut in total local 
expenditures should have some impacts on services. A senior planner at a regional 
planning board noted some communities have run citizen surveys on service quality 
and that in places where many residents said they used to receive more or better 




Local officials noted they were holding on, using a “bubble gum and paper 
clips” (Erie) approach, but were worried about the future. One participant said, “Long 
range planning – you can't do it because you're putting out fires all the time” 
(NYSAC). Another official summarized the situation as follows: 
 
My point is [] you're looking at municipalities that have figured out a 
way in the short term, and I would offer to you that every 
municipality can accomplish this in the short term. But it is, in the 
end, the long term that we just can't sustain. (Dutchess) 
 
Where is the Counter-Narrative? 
 Why is this narrative of inefficient local governments so powerful and where is 
the counter-narrative? During the focus groups, local officials speculated on the 
State’s goal, ranging from eliminating villages and towns, consolidating school 
districts, to forming a regional governance system. Nevertheless, local officials 
pointed out the current pressures from the State that are pushing them to the brink of 
service cuts do not make sense. A long-time official noted: 
 
I've never seen it like this…. The attitude out of the State level 
towards municipalities is so negative…. I don't quite understand it, 
because at the end of the day, municipalities are the ones that are 
providing the direct services to the residents. This attitude from the 
State, particularly out of the Executive, is…they want to strangle out 
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a lot of these municipalities as if that's the answer, but there's really 
no foresight as to what happens after that. (NYCOM) 
 
As pointed out by local officials, local governments deliver many services to citizens 
and they interact with citizens face to face. So why are local officials unable to craft a 
counter-narrative? And why would the State and citizens perpetuate a narrative that 
can lead to fiscal crises across the state and threaten public services? This study argues 
the combination of this narrative and existing legal and political institutions mean 
there is no actor for whom the benefits of creating a counter-narrative outweigh the 
costs. Local governments may be the one group for which the benefits may outweigh 
the costs, but they are not a singular actor (which creates collective action problems) 
and have limited powers to create a strong counter-narrative. 
The State 
The State gains political and fiscal benefits from the current narrative. 
Politically, the State has identified a highly visible problem (large property tax bills), 
the cause (inefficient local governments), and can claim credit for implementing an 
immediate solution (the tax cap). The State also makes fiscal gains as the inefficient 
local government narrative allows it to continue mandating local services with little to 
no cost to the state budget. Focus group participants (regardless of government type) 
identified state mandates as one of the main drivers of fiscal challenges. However, 




Unlike local governments, the State has an extra option for dealing with its 
fiscal challenges by cutting payments to local governments. County officials noted the 
delay in reimbursements for mandated services were quite common when the State 
was under fiscal stress – “When the State was in financial stress a few years ago, our 
reimbursements were lagging really bad” (NYSAC) – but even when the State is not 
under fiscal stress an official noted, “Every year, something is late and you ha[ve] to 
go play catch up and start screaming” (NYSAC). 
Local officials noted the State’s complete control over reimbursement 
decisions. Prior to 2013, counties entirely funded the Early Intervention Program20 
upfront and then sought reimbursement from the State. However, as of 2016, only 
80% of the promised reimbursement has been made (NYSAC and NYSCEA 2016). 
The State also promised to pay 40% of community college costs (New York Codes, 
Rules and Regulations Title 8, Chapter V, Subchapter D, s602.8), but has been 
providing less than 25% (NYSAC and NYSCEA 2016). A local official noted the 
weakness of these promises:  
 
There's actually a law on the books in a couple of cases that 
require[s] the State to pay a certain level [for mandated 
services]…but they're paying less than that…what happens is…if 
                                                 
20 The Early Intervention Program covers a wide range of services for families with 
children under the age of three with disabilities. Some examples are family education 
and counseling, special instruction, speech pathology, occupational therapy, physical 
therapy, psychological services, nursing services, and nutrition services. 
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they're having fiscal difficulties, then those laws on the books sort of 
go by the wayside. (Dutchess) 
 
Although this cost-shifting is most visible for counties, the pressures were common 
across all local government types. A long-time official summarized the State behavior 
as follows: 
 
The State continues to look at this unfunded mandate thing and says, 
‘Hey, this is pretty fun. We get to go out and Christmas charge on 
my neighbor's credit card, and we can continue to add new services 
and get all the credit for basically making friends with this or that 
special interest group out there, and we'll pin it on the local 
governments!’ While at the same time beating us over the head like a 
baby seal on the beach. (NYCOM) 
 
As long as there is an efficient local government narrative, the State can 
decrease the amount of revenues it sends to local governments while avoiding 
making direct cuts in services. In the hierarchy of federalism, local 
governments have few options for legal redress. Local officials pointed out, 





Citizens have strong anti-tax sentiments and a narrative of local government 
inefficiency can justify demands for lower taxes. As one community leader said, 
“When you ask someone if they want their property taxes capped, of course they're 
going to say yes and that they support it. Who doesn't want their property taxes to go 
down?” (phone interview). One official explained that residents “want [] reduced 
revenue but there is an expectation of continued service because there is this fallacy 
that there is a lot of waste in government” (Dutchess). Local officials try to meet these 
expectations, because they do not want to anger their voters. In one community, local 
officials asked for public input when they felt services can no longer be maintained 
without a tax increase. The official recalled: 
 
[Our] board of supervisors held a series of informational meetings 
starting in April through the middle of June and the goal was to talk 
to the constituency to see what it was they were willing to do 
without and what they wanted funded. But a lot of that was not 
happening…. They came up with all kinds of things that they 
thought that the board of supervisors and the other county officials 
had not thought of in order to keep the tax rate down. (NYSAC) 
 
At present, local officials said they are keeping service cuts to a minimum. 
Therefore, citizens do not have any incentive to create a counter-narrative – the only 
result would be they decide to tax themselves more when there is no promise of more 
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or better services. As one official noted, “it is difficult to override the tax cap, when 
you’re not increasing service[s]” (Erie). Focus group participants emphasized they had 
not eliminated services yet, and thus any impacts on services are likely to be 
degradations on the margins. These degradations are hardly noticeable (and when 
citizens do notice, they blame local governments), while the benefits of a lower 
property tax bill and a tax freeze check are highly visible. 
Local Governments 
 Local officials are in a unique position to foresee the future costs of continued 
expenditure cuts. However, their position in a multi-level government hierarchy 
severely limits their power, and collective action problems make it difficult to create a 
counter-narrative. Local officials seemed to recognize the State’s political narrative as 
an environmental constraint in which they must operate. Even though most local 
officials agree the tax cap has exacerbated fiscal stress, they are cautious about voicing 
these opinions because “they [the State] might throw us [local governments] a crumb 
of [] money once in a while” (NYCOM). 
The fiscal risks of a counter-voice are real. In 2014, the Mayor of Syracuse 
spoke out against the Governor, pointing out that the State’s economic development 
programs, such as the “Buffalo Billion”21 that focus on bringing in external businesses 
like SolarCity (the largest rooftop solar installer in the US), are unsustainable. The 
Mayor instead called for state funds for more pressing needs, such as aging 
infrastructure in Upstate New York. In 2014, Syracuse had a record of 391 water main 
                                                 
21 Corruption charges on the distribution of the Buffalo Billion funds have led to on-
going federal and state investigations. Many developers who received benefits from 
the Buffalo Billion were also important donors to Governor Cuomo’s campaign. 
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breaks. The Governor fired back with comments that “upstate cities have to be 
stronger economically. They have to do better” and that they should “fix their own 
pipes” (Weaver 2015). In the following year, the Governor followed up with a $0 
increase in aid to the City of Syracuse, dubbed “the Syracuse Zero.” 
The narrative also has a self-enforcing political power. As long as local 
governments maintain services with dwindling resources, this proves the State’s claim 
that there is waste at the local level. Despite local officials’ claims that they are 
maintaining services, it is unlikely there have not been any service degradation in light 
of the expenditure cuts ($1.7 billion) and personnel cuts (18,200 jobs). Meanwhile, if 
local governments fail to maintain services, they are likely to be the target of blame 
for declining services. 
If 1,600 local governments worked together, they may be able to create a strong 
counter-narrative, but the heterogeneity among local governments makes this 
collective action difficult. The different expenditure burdens illustrate this 
heterogeneity (see Figure 8). For example, counties function as “arms of the state” and 
mostly deliver state-mandated social services. 23% of county expenditures are on 
social services. This means that counties have been especially effective at creating a 
narrative of state mandates driving county property taxes. Using the phrase, “9 for 
100” the New York State Association of Counties (NYSAC) has identified nine state 
mandates that account for 100% of county property taxes. These mandates were 
Medicaid, Safety Net/TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), child 
welfare, preschool special education, indigent defense, probation, early intervention, 
youth detention, and pensions. A NYSAC report estimated the cost of these nine 
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programs at $4.7 billion, accounting for 100% of the county property tax levy 
statewide (excluding New York City; NYSAC 2015). 
For cities, employee benefits and public safety (police and fire) are the largest 
categories of expenditures (each 25%; see Figure 8). City employees are more likely 
to be unionized, and this enables cities to build a narrative around unions as a driver of 
costs. In a NYS Legislature’s joint budget hearing on local governments, the Mayor of 
Syracuse noted these challenges: 
 
Pensions are by far the biggest uncontrollable cost the City is 
challenged with paying. The pension system is a New York State 
benefit. Pensions are a State controlled, State run and State 
authorized fund – local governments simply receive a bill. Your 
decisions dictate vesting, retirement eligibility, benefits and 
employee contributions. This is not a case where local Syracuse 
officials made bad decisions and we are now looking to you to help 
rectify the results of those decisions. (Mayor Stephanie Miner, Joint 
Budget Hearing, January 28, 2013) 
 
However, unions are a strong political group in NYS and any attempts to push back 
against union contracts are likely to result in little benefit to cities due to the 
Triborough Amendment that protects any stipulations in previous contracts. 
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Data source: New York State Office of State Comptroller Local Government Data 
Note: The two largest expenditure categories are labeled inside chart. For ease of 
representation, the chart pies exclude expenditure categories that are 1percent or less 
of total expenditures. These categories are as follows: community services (1percent), 
economic development (1percent), and utilities (0.3percent) for counties; social 
services (1percent), community services (1percent), health (0.02percent), and 
education (0.01percent) for cities; health (1percent), social services (1percent), 
community services (1percent), economic development (1percent), and education 
(0.14percent) for towns; social services (1percent), economic development (1percent), 




In comparison, villages and towns have less visible drivers of costs. Villages, 
similar to cities, spend most expenditures on employee benefits (18%) and public 
safety (19%). However, there is significant variety among villages, which makes it 
difficult to create a “village story.” For example, according to Comptroller data, 69 
villages have populations less than 500, while 36 villages have populations over 
10,000. These differences translate into a variety of service levels and unionization 
rates across villages. Towns spend most of their budgets on transportation (20%) and 
employee benefits (17%). The spending on transportation largely reflects road 
maintenance, and town officials noted the burden of maintaining roads because non-
residents use the roads without necessarily contributing to the tax base of the towns. 
Both town and village officials pointed to less visible state regulations and mandates 
(e.g. dog licensing, data reporting requirements) that add up to significant burdens. 
The problem is these costs look so small on their own and make it difficult to create a 
strong narrative. 
Another problem is the invisibility of services that local governments provide. 
The quality and quantity of general local services are only noticeable when they fail to 
meet minimum standards. For example, residents are only likely to remember local 
governments maintain roads when there is a pothole, but there is little personal 
interaction between the workers who fill the pothole and citizens. In contrast, school 
districts have a stronger connection to citizens and this translates into more power. 
Education services are a highly visible service, because they are delivered directly 
from a teacher to students. In 2014, Governor Cuomo tried to push a series of public 
education reforms tied to Common Core requirements, including linking standardized 
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test scores to teacher evaluations. However, he had to pull back on these reform efforts 
after strong pushback from parents choosing to opt out of these tests (in 2015, 200,000 
students opted out; Harris 2015). 
The diversities among local governments create barriers to communicating 
with state leaders. Local officials recalled conversations with state senators in which 
the words “unfunded mandates” are followed by a head shake or eye roll. A state 
senator recalled a conversation with the Governor about mandate relief in which he 
said, “All the groups can’t decide which one they want. Every time I sit down with a 
different stakeholder they give me ten different ones and they never come to the table 
with the same issues” (email correspondence). A focus group participant summarized 
the difficulty of creating one voice across the 1,600 local governments: “There [are] 
too many parochial turf battles in local government that hurts us [when] fighting to put 
forth a united message…. We're not united ourselves, so to speak, in framing a 
positive message to the State” (NYCOM). 
Local governments are also ineffective in communicating with citizens. The 
Governor has already introduced the problem (high taxes), the cause (inefficient local 
governments), and the solution (tax cap), and local officials are now simply reacting. 
The Governor has an advantage in that there is only one governor for the entire state. 
This makes his voice more powerful in that citizens and the media pay attention to his 
words. The Governor also has more resources that allow him to communicate more 
effectively. In the tax freeze checks that the State sent out to homeowners across the 





New York State is providing you with this check to reduce your 
local property tax burden. It represents the tax relief available to you 
this year under the State’s Property Tax Relief and Property Tax 
Freeze programs. You are eligible for the check because your 
property is in a school district of local government that complied 
with the state’s property tax cap. 
 
The message is clear; the State is the main figure trying to save money for taxpayers. 
Meanwhile, local officials have mentioned anecdotally that they have stopped sending 
out hard-copy newsletters or cut back on maintaining their public websites for 
informing residents on local issues. These are “non-essential” and non-mandated 




This paper used a lens of narratives to examine how politics shape local 
government choices in NYS. The findings show that while local governments have the 
legal authority to increase revenues, the narrative of inefficient local governments 
constrains these choices in reality. Meanwhile, both the State and citizens expect 
continued services. Using a strategy of “doing more with less,” local governments so 




What the NYS case shows is there need not be a small government ideology 
for cuts in public services. Even if citizens and public officials want a rich array of 
services, the temptations for the State to push costs and blame down to localities and 
the temptations for citizens to demand lower taxes without service cuts create an 
environment in which localities are encouraged to adopt unsustainable choices. Local 
officials are in the best position to see the fallacy of maintaining or increasing services 
without necessary resources, but they also face significant risks when they ignore the 
wishes of their two masters – the State and voters. 
Theories of fiscal federalism highlight the benefits of a decentralized system 
in which competition among local governments deliver productive and allocative 
efficiency. However, fiscal federalism does not guarantee – and may even erode – 
fiscal sustainability. On the one hand, the power differentials and incentives in the 
multi-level system encourage state governments to dump fiscal costs and political 
blame on local governments as predicted by theories of competitive federalism 
(Nicholson-Crotty 2010). To date, there is limited empirical evidence of how 
widespread this phenomenon is in state-local relationships across the US, but scholars 
have found some evidence in Michigan (Sapotichne et al. 2015), California, Illinois, 
New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Virginia (SBCTF 2014). 
On the citizen side, scholars have already pointed out the problems of lack of 
mobility and full information in a decentralized system (Buchanan and Goetz 1972; 
Lowery 1998), but this study shows the problem of preference error (Lowery 1998) is 
exacerbated when state-level actors have incentives to intentionally spread misleading 
information. Despite how unsustainable citizen demands for services with insufficient 
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taxes are, local officials try to meet these demands. This delivers allocative and 
productive efficiency, but at the cost of sustainability. Local governments know fiscal 
sustainability is eroding, but a system of fiscal federalism focused on competition does 
not solve the collective action problem. This is not to say collective action is 
impossible. In 2014, all of the local government associations in NYS and the New 
York State School Boards Association created a coalition called the Municipal 
Innovation Exchange (MIX) to search for solutions to fiscal challenges. However, the 
organization has not shown any activities after 2014 and conversations with local 
association leaders confirmed MIX is essentially no longer operating. 
Given that local officials are the direct providers of many services who worry 
about long-term planning, institutional changes to make cooperation among local 
governments easier may be the shortest path to fiscal sustainability. This paper 
concludes with two recommendations. First, structural changes to state-local 
relationships that decrease the temptation for states to push costs down to the local 
level are necessary. Many states have adopted rules to limit unfunded mandates, but 
without local options for legal redress, these rules mean little in practice. A possibility 
may be giving local governments more legal authority to push back against unfunded 
mandates. For example, in NYS, a recent state court ruling (Matter of County of St. 
Lawrence v. Shah, 136-143) on October 27, 2016 reversed a 2015 decision by a lower 
court, and recognized local governments also have due process protections provided 
by the state and federal constitutions. The 2015 decision denied this protection, based 
on the argument that counties are not “persons.” In other words, this decision is the 
first instance in NYS to affirm local governments have the right to sue the State for 
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withholding funds that have been promised to them. Another option could be a federal 
law that prohibits states from passing unfunded mandates on to local governments. 
Second, changes to how we talk about local finance are necessary. Although 
state governments have incentives to push an inefficient local government narrative, 
the narrative would have less power if citizens better understood the connection 
between local taxes and local services. Better knowledge of which cognitive biases are 
widespread in public finance discourses and how to ameliorate them would be useful. 
As the first-line communicators with citizens, local officials will play a significant role 
in changing the narratives that citizens tell each other. More research on how local 
officials communicate with citizens regarding taxes and services, the perceived 
challenges, and how these relate to widespread measures of fiscal conditions is 
necessary. As this case study shows, stories are powerful; but stories can also change. 
How the story of “inefficient local governments” ends will have significant 
implications for our future quality of life.
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APPENDIX 4. Formulas for Calculating Tax Levy Limits in New York State 
 
Step 1: Calculate the Base Tax Levy Limit 
{[(Prior fiscal year tax levy + Prior year reserve offset – Reserve amount including 
interest earned) x Tax base growth factor*] + PILOTS receivable in the prior fiscal 
year – Tort exclusion amount in prior fiscal year} x Allowable levy growth factor** - 
PILOTS receivable in coming fiscal year + Available carryover = Base Tax Levy 
Limit 
 
Step 2: Calculate Final Tax Levy Limit 
Base tax levy limit + Net of Transfer of Government Function (as determined by 
Office of State Comptroller) + Tax levy necessary for expenditures from court orders 
or judgements resulting from tort actions for any amount in excess of 5percent of the 
total taxes levied in the prior fiscal year + Levy necessary to pay for increases to the 
system average actuarial contribution rate (or normal contribution rate) of pension 
funds over 2 percentage points = Final Tax Levy Limit 
 
* Tax base growth factor: Based on Tax and Finance determination of “quantity 
change,” such as new construction, newly taxable status of existing property, or 
measurable improvements to taxable property within the boundaries of the local 
government or school district. 
** Allowable levy growth factor: Lesser of 1.02 or inflation factor (percent change in 
CPI for the 12 month period ending 6 months before the start of the coming fiscal year 
over the prior 12-month period), but never lower than 1.00. 
 
Source: 2011 Laws of New York Chapter 97. 




APPENDIX 5. Details of Observation Data Collection 
Event Date Location 
 Municipal Innovation Exchange Summit Apr. 25, 2014 Syracuse, NY 
 Preparation meeting for Local Fiscal 
Stress conference with union leaders, 
local government association leaders, 
school board association leaders 
Nov. 13, 2014 Albany, NY 
 “Local Fiscal Stress: State Austerity 
Policy and Creative Local Response” 
Conference 
Dec. 9, 2014 
Saratoga 
Springs, NY 
 “Property Taxes and New York’s 
Future: Solving the Fiscal Crisis of 
Counties” Conference 
Jan. 20, 2015 New York, NY 
 NYCOM Winter Legislative Meeting Feb. 9, 2015 Albany, NY 
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This dissertation project had two main goals. Empirically, this project updates 
the older studies of cutback management (e.g. Downs and Rocke 1984; Levine 1978; 
Pagano 1988; Schick 1983) with recent empirical findings on local government 
behavior after the Great Recession. Theoretically, this thesis advances a theory of 
pragmatic municipalism as a lens to study local government behavior that bridges the 
agency-structure divide in existing theories. Pragmatic municipalism rejects the 
agency-structure dualism, and instead recognizes that local governments shape and are 
shaped by their environments – state policy, demography, economy. Pragmatism’s 
emphasis on problem-solving is useful for explaining local government choices on 
how to deliver services and how to raise revenues. 
The first paper provides national empirical evidence that municipalities under 
more stress are using both privatization and cooperation to deliver services, rather than 
resorting to a political project of simply eliminating services. Regardless of what the 
motivations for service maintenance are (e.g. desires to protect the public interest or 
desires to remain in political office), the results show local governments by and large 
balance community needs with fiscal constraints. They exercise agency through 
managers who make strategic decisions about service delivery and manage union 
pressures in the process. The second paper shows how structure limits revenue choices 
among cities across the nation. Cities with strong property tax bases rely more on the 
stable and broad-based property tax, while cities with higher poverty and decreases in 
median home values rely more on charges. The third paper shows how local 
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governments in New York State try to balance community needs within fiscal 
constraints and the resulting imbalance due to politics and lack of power. In a state 
wherein a narrative of inefficient local governments is widespread, the outcome of a 
tax cap that purportedly makes local governments more efficient is an imbalance 
between current expenditure needs and future needs, an imbalance of expenditure 
responsibilities and revenue-raising power between state and local governments, and 
an imbalance between desires for lower taxes and demands for services. 
The three papers show the limits of fiscal federalism theories that assume 
increased transparency and responsiveness in a decentralized system of governance. 
Instead, today’s governance system is full of confusion with plenty of 
miscommunication between local governments and residents that leads to less fiscal 
sustainability. Reflecting local governments’ legal status as creatures of the state, 
state-local relationships have significant implications for how much confusion there is 
and whether local governments can try to ameliorate this confusion. There is some 
possibility of push back among local governments in service delivery and alternative 
revenue sources, but little room for progressive agency. On the expenditure side, use 
of alternative service delivery to maintain services is linked to capacity. On the 
revenue side, structural constraints for charges remain strong and thus, charges are 
unlikely to make up for the total loss of state aid and property taxes. 
Ironically, local governments’ willingness to be pragmatic and their ability to 
balance various pressures may be pushing them down an unsustainable path. Local 
governments are using service delivery and revenue innovations to meet current 
demands for services, but how long and how far will these strategies last? While there 
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is a strong focus on maintaining services, the papers in this study do not find evidence 
for increasing services in response to growing needs or investing in future services 
(e.g. infrastructure). Previous works in public finance and local governments have 
been heavily focused on efficiency, and scholars have called for more attention on 
equity (e.g. Andrews and Entwistle 2010; Clavel 2013; Warner and Hefetz 2002). 
However, the issue of sustainability in local finance is still less studied. This narrow 
emphasis on efficiency also translates into practice. There has been a significant 
decrease in the amount of revenues that local governments receive, but the 
expectations citizens have for local government services do not decline, and the data 
show little service elimination. Using an output per unit input definition of efficiency, 
local governments have become more efficient in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession. However, local governments will not be able to deliver the same level or 
quality of services in the future with a continued mismatch between expenditure needs 
and revenues. 
The papers in this dissertation also show that place matters. The use of 
innovation, whether on the service delivery side or the revenue side, differs by metro 
status, state policy, and region. If fiscal stress at the local level is indeed chronic and 
structural as some scholars predict (Pagano and Johnston 2000; Ward and Dadayan 
2009), then localities will have to continue to use alternative service delivery and 
alternative revenue sources to maintain services. However, the availability of these 
tools is not equal across places. Wealthy localities have a wide range of options – 
privatization, cooperation, property tax, various charges – that they can mix and 
match. However, localities with high needs and low wealth are limited in their 
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choices. State policy and urban context are structural barriers to using charges and 
alternative service delivery over which localities have little control. Without higher 
level intergovernmental aid, the localities that cannot use service delivery or revenue 
innovations may have to start making drastic service cutbacks as we have seen in 
places like Flint and Detroit. 
Figure 9 is a revised version of the visual representation of my broad research 
framework in Chapter 1 (Figure 3). In this dissertation, I explored the potential for 
local government push back on the structural constraints from state policy, 
demography, and economy. The findings across the three papers show the space for 
local government choices is limited – noted by the dotted line around local 
government in the figure below. The use of alternative service delivery and revenue 
sources has allowed local governments to maintain services so far, but the ability to 
use these tools is constrained by structural forces, such as state policy and place 
characteristics. Even though the assumptions of fiscal federalism emphasize the 
potential for better communication between local governments and citizens, this 
dissertation finds narratives can actually be used by state governments to further 













Limitations & Future Research 
  Each paper in this dissertation has limitations that I have discussed in each 
chapter. In this section, I discuss the broad limitations of this dissertation project. First, 
the studies do not compare local government behavior over time so there is little I can 
say about whether these behaviors are new. The studies give insight to local 
government behaviors today in a context that has changed from several decades ago 
when the first cutback management theories emerged. My decision to focus on local 
government behaviors today was based on my goal to build a broad theory of local 
government behavior, rather than a theory that focuses on extreme cases as austerity 
urbanism does. This made the use of a national dataset that covers local governments 
of various sizes and location important. 
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A second limitation is while I have focused on local government choices, I 
have little information on the outcomes of these choices. For example, my papers 
show decisions on revenues, expenditures, service provision, and contracting out, but 
it is unclear how these affect service quality. The national survey data in Chapter 2 
show service elimination is rare, and local officials’ comments in Chapter 4 show that 
they have maintained services. However, the expenditure cuts are real and without any 
process innovation it is likely that service quality has changed. There is no national 
dataset on local service quality, and finding indicators that will be consistent across 
the 50 states is a challenge. This is another instance where a case study may be useful. 
I am designing a survey with the co-author of the first paper to collect data on service 
degradation in New York State. The local strategy of “doing more with less” is 
unsustainable and the structural barriers to using service delivery and revenue tools 
imply a growing divide between localities that can and localities that cannot innovate. 
More studies on the outcome for inter-jurisdictional inequality are necessary. 
This limitation also applies to revenue innovations. Cities are increasing their 
reliance on charges and fees, but there is limited information on how regressive these 
charges are and how much they actually restrict access to essential services. Census of 
Governments Finance data report aggregates of these charges and fees, but do not 
show what services are charged for in detail. We know the use of these tools is 
increasing. More research on this topic can show how to use the benefits of these tools 
without sacrificing equity. Revenue innovations can also take the form of special 
districts. For example, local governments in California are increasingly relying on 
special districts to fund infrastructure projects (Kirkpatrick and Smith 2011) and the 
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growth of special districts between 1972 and 2002 is linked to ability to raise own-
source revenues and diversify revenue bases (Shi 2016). Future studies should explore 
the broader implications for governance and democracy. 
I have made an effort to cover a wide variety of local governments in all three 
papers, but there is still limited knowledge on what rural places are doing. In fact, I 
have limited my analysis on revenue structures in the second paper to non-rural cities. 
This decision was based on the fact that rural places have low rates of revenue 
innovations. In general, local governments are using alternative service delivery and 
alternative revenue sources, but rural places face structural barriers (e.g. size, density, 
types of services provided) to using these tools. The low enthusiasm for charges and 
fees in the third paper also may be a reflection of the rurality of local governments in 
New York State (most of upstate New York is rural). How are local governments in 
rural places coping in the aftermath of the Recession? The answers will have 
implications for state and national politics as well. Recent media reports note the 
growing divide in political ideology between inner cities and the rest of the country 
(Kron 2012), which some suggest is driving the increasing use of preemptions by state 
governments to interfere in local affairs (Yee 2016).  
Lastly, local governments are indeed “creatures of the state,” and which state 
a locality belongs to matters for how local governments function. While we know that 
states matter, there is less knowledge about how states matter. The first two papers in 
this project have used some crude indicators of state policies – state aid, state 
decentralization, stringency of tax and expenditure limits – to explore how state policy 
matters, and the last paper shows that state-local political narratives matter. More 
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Local governments are pragmatic, but the current governance system based on 
fiscal federalism’s assumptions of transparency and competition may not be efficient 
in the long term. Local governments are using a range of service delivery innovations 
and various charges to maintain services after the Great Recession. Despite some 
scholars’ concerns that local governments will become austerity machines that slash 
public services (e.g. Donald et al. 2014; Peck 2014), local governments so far have 
been resilient, balancing the pressures from state governments as well as those from 
citizens. 
Is this a sustainable strategy in an intergovernmental system that is 
restructuring? Service innovation does not necessarily lower costs and economies of 
scale may already be exhausted in many places. Charges and fees may increase 
efficiency, but there are still political and legal barriers to their use and they may not 
bring in adequate revenues to replace shrinking property taxes and state aid. The 
current federalist system of decentralized governance creates an imbalance of 
responsibilities and power at the local level. 
State policies largely determine how much agency local governments can 
exercise, but most federalism studies are focused on federal-state relationships. The 
structural changes are happening at the state-local level and, given the variety across 
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the 50 states, more studies on state-local relationships are needed. This dissertation 
aimed to address this gap in the literature, both empirically and theoretically. 
Local governments have been holding on, but significant changes to local 
services may be just around the corner. A collective conversation about the role of 
local governments and the assumptions of fiscal federalism would be wise before we 




Andrews, Rhys, and Tom Entwistle. 2010. "Does cross-sectoral partnership deliver? 
An empirical exploration of public service effectiveness, efficiency, and 
equity."  Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20 (3):679-
701. 
Clavel, P. 2013. Activists in City Hall: The Progressive Response to the Reagan Era in 
Boston and Chicago. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Donald, Betsy, Amy Glasmeier, Mia Gray, and Linda Lobao. 2014. "Austerity in the 
city: economic crisis and urban service decline?"  Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society 7 (1):3-15. doi: 10.1093/cjres/rst040. 
Downs, George W, and David M Rocke. 1984. "Theories of budgetary 
decisionmaking and revenue decline."  Policy Sciences 16 (4):329-347. 
Kirkpatrick, Lowen, and Michael Peter Smith. 2011. "The infrastructural limits to 
growth: rethinking the urban growth machine in times of fiscal crisis."  
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 35 (3):477-503. 
Kron, Josh. 2012. “Red State, Blue City: How the Urban-Rural Divide Is Splitting 
America” The Atlantic. Available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/red-state-blue-city-how-
the-urban-rural-divide-is-splitting-america/265686/ 
Levine, Charles H. 1978. "Organizational decline and cutback management."  Public 
Administration Review 38 (4):316-325. 
Pagano, Michael A. 1988. "Fiscal Disruptions and City Responses Stability, 
 215 
 
Equilibrium, and City Capital Budgeting."  Urban Affairs Review 24 (1):118-
137. 
Pagano, Michael A., and Jocelyn M. Johnston. 2000. "Life at the Bottom of the Fiscal 
Food Chain: Examining City and County Revenue Decisions."  Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism 30 (1):159-170. 
Peck, Jamie. 2014. "Pushing austerity: state failure, municipal bankruptcy and the 
crises of fiscal federalism in the USA."  Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society 7 (1):17-44. doi: 10.1093/cjres/rst018. 
Schick, Allen. 1983. "Incremental budgeting in a decremental age."  Policy Sciences 
16 (1):1-25. 
Shi, Yu. 2016. "The Rise of Specialized Governance in American Federalism: Testing 
Links Between Local Government Autonomy and Formation of Special 
District Governments."  Publius: The Journal of Federalism. doi: 
10.1093/publius/pjw025. 
Ward, Robert, and Lucy Dadayan. 2009. "State and local finance: Increasing focus on 
fiscal sustainability."  Publius: The Journal of Federalism 39 (3):455-475. 
Warner, Mildred, and Amir Hefetz. 2002. "Applying Market Solutions to Public 
Services An Assessment of Efficiency, Equity, and Voice."  Urban Affairs 
Review 38 (1):70-89. 
Yee, Allie. 2016. “Growing Southern cities are increasingly targets of state 
preemption” Available at https://www.facingsouth.org/2016/04/growing-
southern-cities-are-increasingly-targets-o 
